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The Prometheus Principle: Using the
Precautionary Principle to Harmonize the
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms
JOHN

S.

APPLEGATE*

INTRODUCTION

For many thousands of years, human beings have selectively bred plants and
animals better to serve their needs and wants. Over time, the process of
choosing and propagating the most desirable traits of an organism became more
deliberate and systematic. Since the work of Gregor Mendell and Charles
Darwin,2 humans have had a pretty clear idea of the mechanics of selective
breeding. Since the discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick,3 we have known
the mechanism. Still more recently, scientists have learned how to manipulate the
genetic mechanism at the molecular level. This has pushed the long history of
selective breeding into a new phase, in which neither the ability of the subject
plants or animals to mate, nor the randomness of the results in the offspring, is an
obstacle to the creation of new breeds with potentially enormous utility to
humans.
Drought-resistant crops, pest-resistant crops, and foods with
heightened nutritional content are among the many advances within sight.
Genetic modification (GM) is powerful because it manipulates the
fundamental workings of the world around us. Like atomic energy, which was
first put to use less than eight years before Watson and Crick discovered DNA,
the great power of genetic modification may have a dark side. Whatever benefits
atomic energy may have conferred on humans, it has also left us with a legacy of
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Email:
jsapple@indiana.edu. I want to thank Kurt Buechle, Class of 2001, for invaluable research leads and challenging
debates about GMOs.
I. Gregor Mendel, 1822-1884, was an Austrian monk. His work on plant genetics was published in the
1860s, but not widely accepted or acknowledged until after his death. See GREGOR MENDEL, GREGORMENDa'S
EXPERIMENTS ON PLANT HYBRIDS: A GUIDED STUDY (Alain F. Corcos & Floyd V. Monaghan eds., 1993).

2. CHARLES DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859). Darwin, of course, wrote about natural selection, of which
human selection is but a subset. Human selection is a process in which humans create an environment that favors
certain traits.

3. James D. Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA, and by implication its copying
mechanism, at Cambridge University in 1953. See generally JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A
PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE STRUCTURE OF DNA (1969).
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environmental degradation and a continuing threat of annihilation. Genetic
modification manipulates not just the building blocks of inanimate elements like
uranium and plutonium, but of life itself. Genetic modification poses real dangers,
if not of a biological holocaust, then of weeds, pests, and diseases that are
aggressively invasive and resist chemical control; of further erosion of the genetic
diversity upon which the quality of our lives depends; and of novel toxins and
serious food allergies. And if western culture teaches nothing else, it is that
playing God like this exacts a terrible vengeance.
The two stories, of astonishing benefits and of fearsome dangers, dominate
perceptions of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and consequently
dominate their regulation. The first point of view regards genetic technology as
having enormous potential benefits and relatively minor, or at most manageable,
risks. Accordingly, regulation should encourage the development of this
technology, and new organisms and their derivatives should be regulated on a
case-by-case, product-by-product basis. The second point of view focuses on
the potential dangers common to GMO technology, and hence to its products.
This view counsels regulation that forbids GMOs or at least applies strict
screening tests and other controls to all GM products. The United States, a
strong supporter of GMO technology, has taken the first approach; the European
Union, whose population is strongly opposed to GMOs, has taken the second.
This has become a source of considerable tension in trade and environmental
relations between these economic superpowers.
In this article, I seek, first, to clarify the difference in the two approaches and
the extent to which they rest on two fundamentally different conceptions of GM
technology, I will call these conceptions the Frankenstein and the Better Living
through Chemistry narratives. Little progress will be made in harmonizing the
regulation of GMOs by merely adopting and adapting of one or the other of these
widely divergent accounts of GM technology.4 Second, I will describe the
existing efforts to bridge the gap between the two regulatory systems through the
use of prior informed consent, sustainable development, and the precautionary
4. See Sheila Jasanoff, Commentary: Between Risk and Precaution-Reassessing the Future of GM Crops, 3
J. RISK RES. 277, 277 (2000).
The trans-Atlantic controversy that erupted in 1999 between proponents and opponents of
genetically modified (GM) crops has been framed in sharply dualistic terms more
appropriate to a Manichean than a modernist worldview: as a conflict between
enlightenment and reaction, rationality and superstition, science and ignorance, trust and

skepticism, free trade and protectionism.
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principle. 5 Third, I will argue that, of these, the precautionary principle is the
only workable candidate for a harmonizing role. The precautionary principle is an
approach to regulation under uncertainty, and it has been adopted in many
international and domestic environmental settings. Probably its most authoritative
statement appears in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation." 6 Properly construed, this
principle defines a process for taking environment- and health-protective actions
while the dangers of not taking such protective action remain uncertain. Finally, I
will propose a supporting narrative for the precautionary principle, based on the
Prometheus legend, which acknowledges the dangers of technology and the need
for foresight to discern and address them, but also recognizes that technology
dangers can be addressed without abjuring all of its benefits.
I. Two NARRATIVES
Observers have long been puzzled by the widespread, visceral opposition to
GMOs in the absence of actual instances of human or environmental catastrophe,
or indeed of any serious injury at all. Nuclear energy has its Three Mile Island
and Chemobyl, toxic chemicals have their Bhopal and Woburn and DES, and yet
they continue to be used in a broad range of industrial and developing societies.
GMOs, on the other hand, are thriving in a few countries, but the subject of
sustained attack in many.
These differences are typically put down to an irrational and anti-scientific
popular discontent with technology. However, the way that people construct
reality-and especially normative reality-is not limited to scientific and other
quantitative analyses. For two decades, legal scholars, following the lead of the
humanities, have recognized the critical importance of narratives-stories-to the
way that humans perceive their world and construct law to give the world
5. My focus is environmental, health, and safety regulation. GMOs implicate a remarkable range of important
regulatory interests, including free trade, intellectual property, and global economic equity, which I will address

only in passing. Likewise, in keeping with the topic of the symposium, I will limit my purview to agricultural
crops and food, even though GMOs find many other uses, for example, in agricultural animals and in
pharmaceuticals. See John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction: Syncopated Sustainable
Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001).

6. Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), June 14,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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normative structure. The locus classicus of narrative in the legal academy is
Robert Cover's celebrated Nomos and Narrative essay. Cover introduced his
subject as follows:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every
constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture.
Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it
meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be
observed, but a world in which we live.
In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably
related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be
located in discourse-to be supplied with history and destiny,
beginning and end, explanation and purpose. And every
narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its
moral. History and literature cannot escape their location in a
normative universe, nor can prescription, even when embodied
in a legal text, escape its origin and its end in experience, in the
narratives that are the trajectories plotted upon material reality by
our imaginations.7
Two very different narratives dominate the contentious debate over GMOs. The
Frankenstein narrative takes its name from a now familiar epithet for agricultural
GMOs, "Frankenfoods." The other narrative, Better Living Through Chemistry,
takes its name from a DuPont advertising campaign of 1930s, and it reflects
GMO proponents' confidence in new technologies. Unless we understand these
narratives, there is little hope of reconciling the resulting legal systems.

7. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L REV. 4
(1983).
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A. Frankenstein
1. Playing God
In outline at least, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein8 is familiar to most.
("Frankenstein," of course, is the name of the creator of the monster; the
monster himself is not given a name.) The novel was originally conceived and
written in the summer of 1817 while Mary Shelley was vacationing in the Alps
with her husband, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and their friend, Lord Byron. It
recounts the story of a young Swiss man, Victor Frankenstein, who at university
is enthralled by the possibilities of "natural philosophy, and particularly chemistry,
in the most comprehensive sense of the term. ' 9 After nearly two years of study,
"on a dreary night of November" he creates a living thing, but is so shocked by
his creation that he flees his laboratory.' 0 When he returns, the monster has
disappeared. About two years later, however, the monster kills Frankenstein's
younger brother, and their devoted servant is wrongly executed for the murder.
Frankenstein then meets the monster and learns from him how he suffered
abandonment at his creation, learned language and skills from observing humans,
read Plutarch'sLives and ParadiseLost, and is now rejected, pursued, and
tormented. Finding no comfort from humans, the monster demands that
Frankenstein create a wife as a companion for him. When Frankenstein
ultimately refuses, the monster vows vengeance.
The monster kills
Frankenstein's best friend and, with cruel irony, Frankenstein's own bride.
Frankenstein's father dies of shock from the last deaths. Finally, Frankenstein
himself dies in his attempt to track the monster to the Arctic, and the monster
disappears for good.
Looking to Shelley's Frankenstein as a narrative for GMOs appears all the
more promising when one reads the introduction to the 1831 edition of the novel.
In it, Shelley explains that her idea for the story came out of conversations
between Byron and Percy Shelley concerning "the principle of life, and whether
there was any probability of its ever being discovered and communicated." This
already sounds a bit like GMOs, but the next sentence seems even closer to the
mark: "They talked of the experiments of Dr. Darwin
8. See generally, MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Airmoni PublishingCo.
1963) (1817).
9. Id.at 53.
10. Id.at 60-61.
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...who

[was supposed to have] preserved a piece of vermicelli in a glass case,
till by some extraordinary means it began to move with voluntary motion."' 1 No,
it wasn't quite the Darwin. In 1831, Charles Darwin was just setting off on the
Beagle for the Galapagos Islands; Origin of Species was not published until 1859.
Shelley was referring to Erasmus Darwin, Charles' grandfather, and Shelley was
confused about precisely what the elder Darwin did. He did not bring pasta to
life; rather, he wrote about an insect, vorticellae, that appears to be dead and then
revivifies when water is added. He also wrote about a paste (not pasta) of water
and flour that, when left for some days, would be teeming with "animacules" that
were previously invisible.' 2 Even though a different Darwin was referred to,
however, it should be clear that he and Frankenstein were both engaged in what
can fairly be characterized, like GMOs, as biological innovation.
The Frankenstein analogy is used by opponents of GM technology merely as
an epithet to suggest in a superficial way the unnaturalness of the enterprise. 13 I
would like to show that the analogy actually works at a serious level, too.' 4 The
Frankenstein narrative relates the dangers of tinkering with the secrets of life
itself. Like genetic modifiers, Frankenstein's aspiration was grandiose but well
meaning-to create a "new species [that] would bless me as its creator and
source."' 5 But the horror that flows from Frankenstein's ambition provides a
straightforward moral: "Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my
example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much
happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who
aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.' 16 He counsels the explorer
who finds him to "[s]eek happiness in tranquility and avoid ambition, even if it be
only the apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and

I1.Id. at 16-17.
12. LEONARD WOLF, THE ANNOTATED FRANKENSTEIN 4 (1977); see also Ashton Nichols, The Anxiety of
Species: A Romantic Natural History, 28 THE WORDSWORTH CIRCLE 130-36 (1997), available at
http://www.dickinson.edu/-nicholsa/Romnat/ (providing links to websites on Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin,
Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, Erasmus Darwin and the "Frankenstein Mistake").
13. For example, Germany's Green Party minister for food and agriculture wants to move agriculture "back to
nature." Julia A. Moore, More than a Food Fight, 17 ISSUES IN SCI.& TECH. 31, 31 (2001).
14. For serious and very interesting explorations of Frankensteinas itrelates to genetic engineering of animals
and of human cloning, see Dena S. Davis, Religious Attitudes toward Cloning: A Tale of Two Creatures, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1999). See also BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE GENETIC ENGINEERING OF ANIMALS (1995).
15. SHELLEY, supra note 8, at 57.
16. Id at 56. Adopting a more explicitly religious tone, Frankenstein later says, "like the archangel who
aspired to omnipotence, I am chained in an eternal hell." Id at 211.

2001]

THE PROMETHEUS PRINCIPLE

discoveries."' 7 This, then, is the philosophical objection to GMOs: it is hubris to
advance science beyond that which "nature will allow," damning "any human
'8
endeavor to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world.'
Further, ventures "in science and discoveries" necessarily take one into
unknown realms where the dangers may be great. IfFrankenstein did not initially
appreciate the potential for harm from his creative enterprise, he understood it all
too well when it came to making a partner for his monster. He tells us: "I was
now about to form another being, of whose dispositions I was alike ignorant."
She "might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate, and
delight, for its own sake, in murder and wretchedness." Ultimately, "a race of
devils would be propagated upon the earth who might make the very existence of
the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror."' 9 These three
fears-of the unknown, of the individual dangers of the new species, aid of
social instability-led Frankenstein to refuse to create the monster's bride, despite
the monster's threats of retribution. Again, the lesson for GM technology is
clear: genetic engineering is an ambitious voyage into the unknown-perhaps into
the forbidden-and the individual and social consequences are sure to be
horrifying. Far better to deny ourselves the new knowledge than to suffer the
hideous consequences of playing God.2 °
That Shelley would draw this lesson from her tale, and that we would be so
receptive to it, is almost inevitable in western culture. In the classical tradition,
the gods' wrath at human hubris is a continuing theme of Greek myth and
literature. We see it, for example, in Oedipus' reckless pursuit of the knowledge
of his birth. 2' In the Judeo-Christian tradition, Adam and Eve's experience with
the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge was negative, to say the least. It is not
coincidental that ParadiseLost was one of the three books that the monster
reported reading, and references to it appear throughout the novel. GMOs have
also been portrayed as "tak[ing] mankind into realms that belong to God and God
17. Id. at 218.
18. Id. at 56, 17.
19. Id. at 167.
20. Rollin identifies three similar versions of "the Frankenstein thing;' genetic engineering is inherently wrong
because it is playing God; it is wrong because it has unknowable dangers; and it is wrong because it harms the
altered creature." ROLLIN, supra note 14, at 21-22, 68, 71-77, 138. Rollin's third version is not particularly
relevant to crops.
21. Rejecting the entreaties of his queen, Jocaste, he declares he has nothing to fear from this knowledge.
"However base my birth, I must know about it.... I am a child of Luck; I cannot be dishonored." Sophocles,
Oedipus Rex, in THE OEDIPUS CYCLE: AN ENGLISH VERSION sc. 3, 56 (Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald, trans.
(1977).
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alone, ' 92 2 or, less theistically, "fundamentally, genetically engineered crops
substitute human wisdom for the wisdom of nature. 23
Modem technology has provided us with fertile soil for technological
pessimism.2 4 Atomic energy, which also manipulates the basic building blocks of
25
the physical world, is an obvious example. The assumption of god-like powers
has brought with it a great deal of harm, both realized in accidents and
environmental degradation, and as yet unrealized in the form of nuclear holocaust.
Nuclear weapons are not just more powerful than dynamite, in the way that
dynamite was more powerful than black powder; they are vastly more powerful.
Moreover, explosive yield is just one dimension of their many deleterious effects.
Radiation poisoning, epidemics, uninhabitable lands, electromagnetic pulses, vast
economic dislocation, winter-inducing dust clouds, and widespread starvation are
all probable sequelae of a serious nuclear exchange.26 Rachel Carson's classic
Silent Spring cast chemical pesticides in a similar light:
This industry is a child of the Second World War. In the course
of developing agents of chemical warfare, some of the
chemicals created in the laboratory were found to be lethal to
insects. The discovery did not come by chance: insects were
widely used to test chemicals as agents of death for man.
The result has been a seemingly endless stream of synthetic
insecticides. In being man-made-by ingenious laboratory
manipulation of the molecules, substituting atoms, altering their
22. Jeffrey K. Francer, FrankensteinFoods or FlavorSavers?: Regulating AgriculturalBiotechnologyin the
United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 258 (2000) (quoting the Prince of Wales).
It might also be argued that "playing God" ("mocking the stupendous creation") is in itself a kind of moral
or ethical harm to the practitioner of that art or to society as a whole, but I will not consider that set of objections
in this discussion of agricultural crops. A related new biological technology, cloning, especially of human beings,
poses a far clearer case for ethical wrongs. The ethics of animal engineering are the subject of ROLLIN, sprarnote
14.
23. Against the Grain: Part 2 RACHEL'S ENVTL. & HEALTH WKLY., (Envtl. Res. Found.), Feb. 18, 1999, at
22, at http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/bulletin.cfm?issue, quoted in Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe:
Assessing the PrecautionaryPrincipleand the ProposedInternationalBiosafety Protocol,25 TEX. bI-LL. 173,
178 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, More Sorry].
24. See generally EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK:

TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996) (offering numerous examples).
25. The Trinity test moved Robert Oppenheimer to think of a passage from the Hindu scripture in which the
god Vishnu says, "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKINGOF THE
ATOMIC BOMB 676 (1986).
26. For a dramatic and highly pessimistic description of the consequences of nuclear war, see JONATHAN
SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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arrangement-they differ sharply from the simpler inorganic
insecticides of prewar days.27
Carson referred to these synthetic pesticides as "Elixirs of Death," because
they "have immense power not only to poison, but to enter into the most vital
processes of the body and change them in sinister and often deadly ways." This
too is the Frankenstein narrative. Applied to GMOs, GM agriculture holds hugely
negative potential for human health and the non-human environment. 28 It also
poses social risks such as economic dislocation, extinction of the family farm,
and political risks like depriving citizens of "meaningful control over technologies
that could transform their lives."2 9
2. Fear of the Unknown
A fundamental concern of GMO opponents is the unknown as such-fears
of wholly unanticipated effects, large and small, on humans, the environment, or
human society. Such fears are by no means irrational. Theo Colborn, in her
indictment of hormone-disrupting chemicals, explains:
This caution does not arise from any propensity for pessimism
or dislike of technology. It arises from the very nature of our
global experiment and from our inescapable ignorance, which
27. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 16 (1962).
28. Many of the articles on GMOs begin with overviews of the science of genetic engineering and its potential
benefits and risks. A particularly succinct overview can be found in Holly Saigo, Note, Agricultural
Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol, 12 GEO INT'L ENVTL. L REV. 779, 782-98 (2000)
See also Jeffrey K. Francer, supra note 22; Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview ofIsues
in Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267,275-87 (2001); Julie Teel, Note, Regaaiw
Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of Approaches, 8 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 649 (2000).
A good scientific summary can be found in L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and
Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 SCIENCE 2088 (2000), and Richard Lewontin, Gen in te Food,
N.Y. REV.OF BOOKS, June 21, 2001, at 81. A comprehensive, detailed treatment of the risks is Royal Soc'y of
Can., Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada: An
Expert Panel Report on the Future of Biotechnology, 64 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1 (2001), avi/dabeat
http://www.rsc.ca/foodbiotechnology/indexEN.html. The Canadian government was originally dismissive of the
Royal Society of Canada's (RSC) report and produced a strongly pro-GMO response. See CANADIAN BIomIm.
ADVISORY COMM., IMPROVING THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS AND OTHER NOvELFOcsO
IN CANADA (2001), at http://www.cbac-cccb.ca/documents/GMenglish.pdf
More recently, however, the
government has begun to modify its approach to GMOs to respond to some of the RSC recommendations. See
Peter Calamai, Ottawa Changes Mind on GM Food Report Findings, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 23, 2001, at A16.
29. Shelia Jasanoff, Product, Process or Programme: Three Cultures and the Regulation of Biotechnology, in
RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND BIoTEcwcLoGY 31I,
313 (Martin Bauer ed., 1995).

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:207

makes it impossible to foresee consequences or guarantee
safety. The dilemma is simply stated: the Earth did not come
with a blueprint or an instruction book. When we conduct
experiments on a global scale by releasing billions of pounds of
synthetic chemicals, we are tinkering with immensely complex
systems that we will never fully comprehend. If there is a
lesson in the ozone hole and our experience with hormonedisrupting chemicals, it is this: as we speed toward the future,
we are flying blind.3 °
While GM technology is often touted as precision breeding, in fact, it is not.
While genetic manipulation is precise as to the genetic material (and its trait) that
is being removed from one organism and placed in another, it is not precise in
determining the full consequences for the host organism. Genes do not generally
act alone; they work in tandem, interacting with each other to create the
phenotype. 31 Stephen Palumbi vividly (if hyperbolically) describes "brute-force
genetic engineering" (itself a Frankenstinian allusion) as lacking the whole suite of
genes that in ordinary natural or artificial selection regulate each other:
Suppose your town wanted a practice area for the Girl Scout
rifle team. One option would be to develop a rifle range,
complete with professional operators, ear protectors, training
classes, and unimpeded targets. Different sites could be
compared, evaluated, and tested. Regulations could be
developed to fit your community's priorities and altered as
needed to fit emerging needs. That's one way of proceeding.
Another way involves dropping the guns on Main Street and
32
hoping that everything sorts itself out.
Moreover, many genes control aspects of an organism-metabolism, aging,
reproduction, etc.-that are not immediately apparent. (This, of course, is the
source of all the trouble in JurassicPark, Michael Crichton's novel about genetic
engineering.) 33 We simply cannot predict with accuracy all of the effects of a
30. THEO COLBORN ETAL, OUR STOLEN FUTURE 242-43 (1997).
31. See Lewontin, supra note 28, at 82.
32. Stephen R. Palumbi, The High-Stakes Battle over Brute-Force Genetic Engineering, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Apr. 13, 2001, at B8.
33. MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK (1990).
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genetic transfer. The Royal Society of Canada dismisses the idea of "precise"
(their quotation marks) genetic modification and warns that "empirical evidence
suggests that linear models are not good predictors of complex biological
' 34
systems.
Not only are individual genes being introduced into highly complex genetic
structures, but the resultant organisms are being propagated in complex
ecosystems. 35
This uncertainty, which Shelley powerfully captured in
Frankenstein's refusal to create a bride for his monster,36 gives rise to the
concern about superweeds or superpests, that is, genetically modified plants or
insects whose traits allow them to invade and dominate ecosystems and to resist
control measures. Even if a GMO has been tested and found safe in the
ecosystem where it is manufactured, it may have unintended consequences in the
many different ecosystems where it is used.3 7 The experience with exotic
species like zebra mussels in the Great Lakes is sobering. They have had
profoundly negative effects on their new ecosystems and have proven difficult or
impossible to eradicate. 38 GMOs could be worse, because of the unlimited
potential of genetic design.
At the field level, another major concern, genetic "pollution" of non-GMO
species or strains with genetically modified ones, is highly likely, if not inevitable.
Once GM salmon, for example, are introduced into the wild (which has already
happened accidentally), 39 or GMO crops are grown in the field (100 million acres
in 2000),40 it is simply impossible to keep the salmon or the pollen entirely
confined. To the extent that the genetic modification confers advantages for
survival,,the new variety could take over existing genotypes, either by themselves
or by hybridization with neighboring species. Even if GMOs do not become
superweeds and superpests, this pollution will limit the biodiversity that is
essential to healthy ecosystems and sustainable agriculture.
34. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 184-85.
35. Monocultural agriculture is not all that complex-indeed, the goal is to simplify and so control the
ecosystem-but some of the genetic material will almost inevitably leak into the surrounding, uncontrolled
environment.
36. "1was now about to form another being, of whose dispositions I was alike ignorant; she might become ten
thousand times more malignant than her mate .... SHELLEY, supra note 8, at 167.
37. Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 6 ENVTLI.AWYER
577, 584 (2000).
38. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Cartagena Protocol and Biological Diversity: Biosafe or Bio-S,y?, 12G).
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 761, 774-75 (2000) (arguing that xenobiotics are a serious threat to biodiversity but that the
Cartagena Protocol does not regulate them) [hereinafter Adler, Biosafe].
39. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 150-52.
40. Moore, supra note 13, at 31.
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The problem of unintended consequences also appears with GMOs that make
their own pesticides. A now-famous Cornell study showed that monarch
butterflies could be harmed by the pollen of maize plants that had been modified
to express Bt toxin.4' (Further studies, conducted at more environmentally likely
levels of pollen, seemed to confirm this result, 42 though a more recent group of
studies commissioned by the U.S. Department of Agriculture suggests that the
threat to monarchs is quite limited.43) This raises the possibility that plantproduced pesticides, even if they reduce the use of traditional pesticides, 44 still
harm non-target species. Similarly, the destruction of soil microbes could
significantly alter the quality of soils, with severe effects.45
Opponents of GMOs further contend that new crops could contain toxicants
that are either entirely novel or which do not appear (or not in dangerous
quantities) in the non-GM version of the food. There have not as yet been injuries
to humans in this way, but the power of the new technology and the impossibility
of predicting the interactions of many genes suggest the possibility. What has
appeared is the transfer of allergens from one food to a very different one through
the use of genetic material from the allergen. Food allergies, especially extremely
severe ones, are on the rise, 46 and it is difficult to know what will trigger an
allergic reaction. Serious harm was averted when the genes of a Brazil nut were
placed in soybeans, and it was discovered in the pre-market phase that the gene

41. See John E. Losey et al., Transgene Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214 (1999).
42. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 144.
43. See Richard L. Hellmich et al., Monarch Larvae Sensitivity to Bacillus Thuringiensis-purifiedPrteisad
Pollen,
98
PRoC.
NAT'L
ACAD.
Sa.
U.S.
AM.
11925-11930
(2001),
available at
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/21/11925; Karen S. Oberhauser et al., Temporal and Spatial Overlap
between Monarch Larvae and Corn Pollen, 98 PRoc. NAT' L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 11913-11918 (2001),adab/e
at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/ful/98/21/11913; John M. Pleasants et al., Corn Pollen Deposition on
Milkweeds in and Near Cornfields, 98 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM. 11919-11924 (2001) available at
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/21/1 1919; Mark K. Sears et al., Impact of Bt Corn Pollen on Monarch
Butterfly Populations: A Risk Assessment, 98 PRoc NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM. 11937-11942 (2001), ami/abe
at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/21/11937; Diane E. Stanley-Horn et al., Assessing the Impact of
CrylAb-expressing Corn Pollen on Monarch Butterfly Larvae in FieldStudies, 98 PROc NAT'L ACAD.SO.U.S.
AM. 11931-11936(2001), availableat http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/2 1/11931.
One of the studies demonstrated, however, that a particular variety of GMO maize, Novartis Cry 176,
produces Bt pesticide at much higher concentrations and has proven quite harmful to non-target butterflies. SA.
R. Zangerl et al., Effects of Exposure to Event 176 BacillusTthuringiensis Corn Pollen on Monarch and Black
Swallowtail Caterpillarsunder Field Conditions, 98 PROC NAT'L ACAD. SO. U.S. AM. 11908-11912 (2001),
available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/21/11908.
44. See generallyKathryn Brown, Seeds ofConcern, S. AM., Apr. 2001, at 52, 52-53 (reportingiapes'cide
use drops with some crops but not with others).
45. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 107-15.
46. Susan Dominus, The Allergy Prison, N.Y. TIMES MAO., June 10, 2001, at 62, 64.
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transmitted a common and severe allergy to Brazil nuts. Allergies are probably the
most widely acknowledged concern with GMO foods.
The astonishing rate at which GMO acreage has grown in the United States
creates additional unknowns. As we now know, ecosystems are dynamic, so it is
no criticism of GMOs that they upset the "balance" of nature. However, when
the changes are massive and quick-the extreme example is the dinosaur-killing
asteroid-the change outpaces the natural ability to adjust. An editorial in the
Toronto Star summed up this concern with a rhetorical question: "[I]f you are
driving down a steep winding road in the dark and your lights go out, do you
drive faster or pull over and reconsider your options? '4 7 The speed of
introduction also means that we have no long-term experience with these
organisms. Current screening mechanisms can reassure us about short-term
issues (allergies, for example), but cannot predict the consequences of long-term
presence in the environment.48 The changes wrought by new creations,
furthermore, may be irreversible. As Stephen Tromans describes it: "[The]
behavior and characteristics [of GMOs] in the environment, once released, cannot
readily be known. As living entities, they will multiply, adapt, evolve, and interact
in ways that traditional inanimate pollutants cannot. Once released, they cannot be
recalled, retrieved or neutralized."4 9 Dr. Frankenstein worried about precisely this
problem: female monster might engender a "race of devils [that] would be
propagatedupon the earth." GMOs, in sum, provide ample material for fear of
the unknown.
The related fear of catastrophe, on the other hand, arises mainly with regard
to the potential effects of so-called superweeds and superpests on the non-human
environment.5 ° If genetic technology can create new species, it seems entirely
plausible that one of them could be adapted to varying conditions, propagate itself
readily, and crowd out other species. Such organisms are called "weedy" (this
can apply to animals like rats and pigeons, as well as to plants) and examples of

47. Ann Clark, Contradictory Reports Baffle Public TORONTO STAR, Aug. 29, 2001, at A22.
48. Julian Kinderlerer, Genetically Modified Organisms: A European Scientist's View, 8 N.Y.U. ENvI.LJ.
556, 558 (2000).
49. Stephen Tromans, Promise Peril, Precaution: The Environmental Regulation of Genetically Modified
Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 187, 188.
50. See Kate Graziano, Note, Biosafety Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of the Environment, 7
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 188 (1996) (arguing that "agriculture worldwide is at risk"). Jonathan

Adler, a supporter of GMO technology, quotes several of the more hyperbolic claims for the dangers of GMOs.
Adler, More Sorry, supra note 23, at 173-75.
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naturally occurring xenobiotics abound. 5' Increasing weediness is a concern of
ecologists even in the absence of GMOs; 52 genetic modification intensifies the
concern. Superpests are organisms, for example, insects, that are not themselves
created by genetic engineering, but that evolve into extremely resistant varieties in
response to GM plant pesticides. The phenomenon already occurs with
conventional pesticides-it is known as the pesticide treadmill-and the concern
is that GM technology would greatly accelerate the process.
A different kind of catastrophe could befall agriculture in the developing
world due to social and economic dislocation. While GM technology is often
justified in terms of improving the yields of Third World agriculture, GMOs so far
have been designed to facilitate large-scale, "industrial" agriculture which is
monocultural (hence ecologically fragile) and relies heavily on inputs of pesticides
and fertilizers. Expansion of American-style agriculture means sales of American
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, reinforcing the economic dominance of North
over South.
These changes could undermine the small-scale, adaptable
5 1. See David Quammen, Planet of Weeds: Tallying the Losses of Earth'sAnimals and Plants, HARPERS,
Oct. 1998, at 67. Quammen defines "weediness" as:
a constellation of characteristics: They reproduce quickly, disperse widely when given a
chance, tolerate a fairly broad range of habitat conditions, take hold in strange places,
succeed especially in disturbed ecosystems, and resist eradication once they're established.
They are scrappers, generalists, opportunists. They tend to thrive in human-dominated
terrain because in crucial ways they resemble Homo sapiens: aggressive, versatile, prolific,
and ready to travel.
Id.
52. Quammen writes:
Wildlife will consist of the pigeons and the coyotes and the white-tails, the black rats
(Rattus rattus) and the brown rats (Rattus norvegicus) and a few other species of worldly
rodent, the crab-eating macaques and the cockroaches (though, as with the rats, not every
species-some are narrowly endemic, like the giant Madagascar hissing cockroach) and the
mongooses, the house sparrows and the house geckos and the houseflies and the barn cats
and the skinny brown feral dogs and a short list of additional species that play by our
rules. Forests will be tiny insular patches existing on bare sufferance, much of their
biological diversity (the big predators, the migratory birds, the shy creatures that can't
tolerate edges, and many other species linked inextricably with those) long since decayed
away. They'll essentially be tall woody gardens, not forests in the richer sense. Elsewhere
the landscape will have its strips and swatches of green, but except on much-poisoned
lawns and golf courses the foliage will be infested with cheatgrass and European buckthom
and spotted knapweed and Russian thistle and leafy spurge and salt meadow cordgrass and
Bruce Babbitt's purple loosestrife. Having recently passed the great age of biogeography,
we will have entered the age afier biogeography, in that virtually everything will live
virtually everywhere, though the list of species that constitute "everything" will be small.
...My label for that place, that time, that apparently unavoidable prospect, is the Planet
of Weeds. Its main consoling felicity, as far as I can imagine, is that there will be no
shortage of crows.
Id at 67-68.
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agricultural practices of developing economies, with disastrous results. So far, it
is fair to say that biotechnology has "not yet delivered" on its promises of great
benefits for the poor of the world, as opposed to great benefits for the
multinationals that provide the bio-engineered products.53
3. GMOs as Doppelgangers

GMOs raise fears of the unknown, but they also, paradoxically, raise fears of
the familiar. They represent the special dread of the seemingly innocent and
familiar that harbor in which great danger. Frankenstein's monster in some ways
seems an odd symbol for this particular fear; the monster is hideous, and much of
the pathos of the story derives from people's hostile reaction to his appearance.
At the same time, however, Frankenstein's monster is human-almost. Much of
the horror of the tale comes from the monster's closeness to humans.
Frankenstein gets his materials from "the dissecting room and the
slaughterhouse, 54 and when he destroys the not-yet-animated bride he says, "I
almost felt as if I had mangled the living flesh of a human being."5 Rachel
Carson tapped into the same fear in describing "sinister" chemicals that mimic
and then pervert normal metabolic functions.56 The growing concern with
endocrine-disrupting chemicals is based on their ability to mimic naturally
occurring hormones sufficiently to deceive and alter the processes that the
hormones control.
Many commentators have puzzled over the vociferousness of the public
reaction to GMOs in Europe, when so many other forms of modem technology
are readily accepted and relied upon. While there are undoubtedly many factors at
work (Moore points to a fundamental loss of faith in European government
institutions in the wake of Mad Cow disease and Furans in Belgian chicken
feed 57), the Frankenstein narrative suggests this underlying reason. Allergies are a
good example. People with severe allergies need to be very watchful of the
53. Kinderlerer, supra note 48, at 557. From this perspective, the use of the needs of developing countries as a
justification for expanded use of GMOs seems hollow, if not disingenuous. See, e.g., Adler, Biosafe, supra note
38, at 772-74; INDUR M. GOKLANY, APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED

CROPS (Wash. U. Center for the Study Am. Bus., Policy Study No. 157, 2000).
54. SHELLEY, supra note 8, at 58.
55. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). Rollin notes that mixing animal and human traits is often viewed as a
particular wrong. ROLLIN, supra, note 14, at 63-66.

56. This concern has come to fruition in the work of Theo Colbom and her colleagues, who found that many
synthetic pesticides mimic and pervert the function of hormones. See COLBORN, supra note 30.
57. Moore, supra note 13, at 33.
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ingredients in their foods-nuts, and especially peanuts, to which many people are
severely allergic, tend to appear in unlikely places-and they need to be able to
rely on "safe" foods that they know from experience have no allergenicity for
them. Genetic engineering could contribute to the spread of modified crops into
the pool of unmodified crops. If widely grown, the pollen of an allergenic variety
could rapidly invade non-allergenic varieties, and it would become impossible to
find a variety without the allergy-causing gene.5 8 Similarly, GM technology could
reduce the nutritional content of food (a concern more relevant to the developing
than the developed world), but would give no notice of the change. In both
cases, the deceptive familiarity of GMOs causes the concern.
B. Better Living Through Chemistry
1. The ProgressNarrative
Against the technological pessimism reflected in the Frankenstein narrative
must be set the grand tradition in vestem culture of scientific inquiry and
technological achievement. While admiration for science may be on the wane in
popular culture, citizens of industrialized nations owe virtually every aspect of the
previously unimaginable opulence of their lives to triumphs of science and
technology. Say what we will about the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, every
time we turn on a computer or drive a car or watch television or speak on the
telephone-the list is really endless-we are taking advantage of a host of
technologies that were hardly even dreamt of two hundred years ago.
The narrative of progress, and specifically of scientific and technological
progress, is exemplified by the title and subject of a mural by John W. McCoy II,
a Brandywine School painter, called Better Things for Better Living Through
Chemistry.59 McCoy painted it for "Wonder World of Chemistry," the DuPont
exhibit for the 1939 World's Fair. The mural depicts, on the left, a dark and
forbidding picture of American frontier life, complete with log cabin and dirt path.
The characters are a worried mother, clinging children, and a father bent nearly

58. The problem with Starlink maize illustrates the problem. Starlink was approved for animals, not humans,
but somehow it was mixed with maize intended for humans-there is no obvious difference in appearance, and no
cheap test for the difference. While the distributors and buyers of the maize made every effort to recall the food
products made with Starlink, it keeps turning up in unexpected places.
59. The mural was donated in 1999 to the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware. Dupont
Newsroom, Dupont Donates Historic Worlds' Fair Mural to Haley Museum and Library(July 7, 1999), ava/ab/e
at http://dupont.com/corp/whats-new/releases/99/990707a.html.
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double with a heavy burden of sticks on his back. On the right, symmetrically
arranged to heighten the contrast, we find a happy modem family at play. The
daughter no longer clings, but looks out from her picnic -basket-carrying mother's
side with anticipation. The father's only burden is a smiling, healthy little boy
who waves cheerily to the viewer. A shining city (the Wilmington of
Tomorrow?) lies in the background. Separating Before and After, like a bolt of
lightning, is a muscular, laurel-wreathed man, labeled "Chemistry," with a beaker
in one hand and a tome in the other. The mural is striking on a number of cultural
points-especially its negative portrayal of frontier life--but it powerfully conveys
a firm confidence in the ability of science and technology to transform our world
for the better.60 There is no hint of social complication from these wonders of
chemistry.
Technological optimism has a historical tradition of its own. The highly
successful tradition of systematic scientific inquiry in public health, for example,
has yielded longer life expectancies and lower infant and maternal mortality than
has ever been enjoyed by anyone on the planet. (Which is not, of course, to say
that the benefits are evenly distributed; manifestly, they are not.) Great
discoveries like vaccines and antibiotics have saved or improved the lives of
millions and millions. And importantly, many of these improvements have been
industrial, as the McCoy mural suggests. Penicillin was of little consequence until
the industrial capacity and technological know-how of the American chemical
industry was put to work to culture, refine, and package the antibiotic on a
massive scale.
There is also a strong cultural tradition of faith in Progress, which
Christopher Lasch traced over time and cultural milieux in The True and Only
Heaven. This tradition (of vhich Lasch was a critic) promised "a steady
improvement with no foreseeable ending at all" of the quality and comfort of
human life. 61 As James Krier and Clayton Gilette put it, "[t]he [technological]
optimists believe in unending human ingenuity, or at least human ingenuity with

60. It is extremely difficult to capture this confidence today without inviting irony, not to say sarcasm. The
enormous technological advances of the second half of the twentieth century have been irretrievably tarnished by
their hazards, so their images tend to have baggage attached. The phrase, "Our Friend the Atom," (from HEINZ
HABER,THE WALT DISNEY STORY OF OUR FRIEND THE ATOM (1956). For all its shameless boosterism, it is
actually quite informative.) as another example, is universally accompanied by a sneer. This underscores the
visceral power of the Frankenstein narrative: we are virtualy programmed to regard new technologies as disasters
waiting to happen.
61. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICs 39, 48-9 (1991).
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no foreseeable limit.' 6 2 The driver for the application of this ingenuity is the
"uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his
condition," in the words of Adam Smith.6 3 If there is something unsettling about
this constant movement from one state to anotherimpermanence appears to assure a certain continuity in its own
right when conceived as an extension of the self-correcting
procedures of scientific discovery, which allow the scientific
enterprise as a whole to flourish in spite of the constant revision
of particular findings. A social order founded on science, with
its unnerving but exhilarating expansion of our intellectual
horizons, seems to have achieved a kind of immortality
undreamed of by earlier civilizations.64
Technology, in this view, may offer new and even frightening prospects, but it is
part of a far larger-and to some extent inexorable-project of improvement.
Moreover, to the extent that scientific and technical process has in fact paralleled
increased material abundance, freedom, and human happiness, there is little
65
reason to question faith in it.
2. The Continuationof Breeding by Other Means
In the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative, genetic modification is a
technology of enormous power and promise.6 6 Even limiting our consideration to
agriculture, the range of plausible applications is impressive: GM technology can
improve yield, provide protection against pests with fewer pesticides, conversely
resist pesticides and herbicides, increase nutritional value, decrease susceptibility
to drought, and permit cultivation of saline soils. Further, supporters of GMOs
62. James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Casefor Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. LREV.
405, 409 (1985).
63. LASCH, supra note 61, at 53.
64. Id. at 48.
65. Alain Touraine, The Crisis of Progress, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 45, 47 (1995). Touraine argues that the current crisis in belief
in progress occurred when scientific progress seemed to drift away from these benefits, and also seemed to take
control from individuals and give it to large institutions, governments, or international organizations. See id. at
48-51.
66. For fairly typical encomiums to the promise of biotechnology, see Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of
Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and Scientific Issues, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L REV. 717, 719 (2000); Adler,
Biosafe, supra note 38; Adler, More Sorry, supra note 23, at 175-80.
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like to point out that GM technology is central to the achievement of several
important and widely shared goals, such as sustainable agriculture, a nutritionally
adequate food supply for the developing world, and the reduction of expensive
and destructive pesticide use. For example, it is argued that as a secondary effect
GMOs will help to protect biodiversity. The greatest threat to biodiversity is
habitat loss; therefore, by increasing the agricultural (and nutritional) productivity
of existing farmland, GMOs can reduce the pressure to use more and increasingly
marginal non-farm habitat. 67 While it may be debated whether GMOs in fact will
play a major role in achieving these goals and whether there are other ways to
achieve them-new conventional agricultural techniques, better distribution of
existing food supplies, etc.-the potential, at the very least, is there.
In short, "the promising future of Bt-com and GM-crops in general appears
endless. 6 8 It is true that many of these benefits have yet to be realized in
practice. Almost all of the advances in GMOs have so far been directed to
agricultural profitability (a predictable result, in view of the commercial funding of
the research) 69 and only a small number of crops have yet been planted in
significant acreage. 70 Nevertheless, the technological optimists believe that
significant benefits are just around the comer. Given the extraordinarily rapid
progress of the technology to date, this is not an unreasonable expectation.
Despite the great possibilities of GM technology, the Better Living Through
Chemistry narrative also emphasizes that, fundamentally, it is but the continuation
of breeding by other means, an incremental refinement of existing practices.
"Genetic modification appears to be part of the normal and well-established

67. Adler, Biosafe, supra note 38, at 766-68, 771-74; INDUR M. GOKLANY, CTR. STUDY AM. BUS., POLICY
STUDY NO. 157, APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 4 (Aug. 2000).

The seeming logic of this claim is undercut by two facts: first, there has yet to be any significant deployment of
GM crops in areas of the world that are not already awash in surplus agricultural production, so it is strictly
hypothetical; and second, no matter how good they are, genetically modified crops are unlikely to be able to relieve
the extreme poverty of the developing world so much that third world farmers would no longer have any incentive
to seek out new farmland.
68. Kurt Buechle, The Great Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms: Overcoming Fear,
Misconceptions, and the CartagenaProtocolon Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 283,288 (2001).
69. Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective: Are Genetically Modified Organismsthe Bet Way to
Ensure NutritionallyAdequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65 (2001). Arguably, this is the financially
necessary precursor to innovation for the public good. See Buechle, supra note 68.
70. According to Hagen & Weiner, "Soybean, corn/maize, cotton, and canola/rapeseed accounted for most of the
transgenic crop plantings in 1999. Transgenic potato, squash, and papaya also were commercially planted in 1999
but represented less than one percent of the global area planted in GMO crops." Paul E. Hagen & John Barlow
Weiner, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New Rules for International Trade in Living Modified
Organisms, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2001). The world total area of GMO crop plantings was
39.9 million hectares in 1999, of which 72% was in the United States. Id. at 698.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:207

trajectory of gaining control over and manipulating biological processes to achieve
greater productivity."'" Thus, it "makes [no] sense to talk about 'natural' food
crops that are the result of thousands of years of human husbandry. 72 Genetic
modification is just faster, more precise, and can draw on a greater range of
genetic material. 73 As Richard Lewontin puts it, while genetic modification is "a
radically new way to manipulate heredity," even the old way created "organisms
that are not only very different from their wild ancestors, but are in many
characteristics the very opposite of the organisms from which they were
derived., 74 The entities resulting from genetic modification are thus within the
range of normal manipulation-a GM soybean is still recognizably a soybean,
even if a fish gene has been added. While the Frankenstein narrative emphasizes
unknown and catastrophic effects, the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative
places GMOs in the far more comforting context of incremental change in
existing breeding practices.
If GM technology is not entirely new and unknown, its risks are not, either.
The risks of genetic pollution, creation of exceptionally aggressive weedy species,
and unrecognized allergens are not only small but, more importantly, manageable
with proper care. 75 The direct, demonstrated harms from GMOs are, at worst,
few and fir between, and there is no real evidence of catastrophe on the
horizon. 76 Pest resistance can be handled by creating refuges that will reduce the
incentive for new, super strains of insect pests to multiply, by maintaining the
selective advantage of existing strains in certain areas. The spread of superweeds
can be avoided by buffer zones, which can also act as refuges. Moreover,
superweeds are a self-limiting problem, since crop species are highly fragile and
occupy an extremely specialized ecological niche O.e., farms) that must be
maintained by extensive human intervention.77 Wheat, to put in another way,
does not stand a chance in the real world; it can only survive when carefully
71. Stephen B. Brush, Genetically Modified Organisms in Peasant Farming: Social Impact and Equity,9 D.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 137 (2001).
72. Kevin Finneran, What's Food Got to Do With It?, 17 ISSUES So. & TECH. 24, 25 (2001).

73. Conventional breeding is not limited to species (e.g., horse + donkey = mule), but the species must be
closely related; fish cannot mate with strawberries except through genetic engineering.
74. Lewontin, supra note 28, at 81.
75. See Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between the Biosafety Protocol and the PrecautionaryPrinciple 13 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L REV. 949, 967-75 (2001).

76. See Lewontin, supra note 28, at 83; see also Brown, supra note 44, at 55 (reviewing the evidence for
superweeds).
77. Lewontin, supra note 28, at 82-83 (citing JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELTON, THE ECOLOGICALRHs
OF ENGINEERED CROPS (1996)).
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nourished and protected. As a result, GM crops have not in actuality lead to the
loss of natural habitats. In any event, exotic species (kudzu, zebra mussels)
already pose the superweed problem, and, while annoying, they have not seriously
threatened human health or civilization. Finally, allergies-the most credible
problem-can be predicted to some degree (e.g., using nut genes in non-nut
products) and can be screened in advance. 78
The problem of harm to non-target species is a case in point. Whether or not
extrapolation of the Cornell study of monarch butterflies is justified (a hotly
debated subject), 79 GMO proponents note that effects on non-target organisms
are a familiar and indeed inherent problem with all pesticides. Rachel Carson's
plea to end the indiscriminate use of DDT and other synthetic pesticides was
based largely on non-target effects to humans and other animals. Federal law
requires the analysis and consideration of non-target effects in the registration of
a pesticide.80 It is not a new problem at all, and it can be controlled (if not
entirely avoided) by good pesticide application practices. Such practices can,
with some ingenuity, be translated to the use of GM pesticide plants.
Many of the criticisms of GMOs are in fact retooled critiques of monoculture
generally and industrial agriculture specifically (which, from the Better Living
Through Chemistry point of view, makes perfect sense, since GMOs are but an
extension of modem agricultural practices). 8 ' A good example is the experience
in the Philippines with a whole series of conventional rice hybrids, each of which
seemed better than the traditional varieties but each of which succumbed to some
aspect of the Philippine environment. When the inventors gave up and tried to
return to the original varieties, they had been "all but eliminated" when farmers
switched to the first hybrid.8 2 This misadventure, like the risk of a general blight

78. Proponents of GMOs like to use the analogy of fire. It certainly poses serious dangers, rangingfiomseoe
bums on an individual to conflagrations encompassing human or natural communities, but it is also eminently
controllable. And when its benefits are measured against these risks, there is simply no question of its net
desirability. At a minimum, we can and should draw distinctions among uses of GMOs in terms of their risks,
ability to control, and benefits. The RSC report, for example, convincingly demonstrates that the risks of genetic
pollution by transgenic animals, specifically fish, are more serious, because of their much greater ability to mix
with other populations. Similarly, to continue the fire analogy, the use of controlled bums is appropriate for some
objects, in some places, and in some conditions, but not in others.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
80. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(5) (2000).
81. See generally David Pimentel, Overview of the Use of Genetically Modified Organisms and Pesticides in
Agriculture, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 51 (2001) (evaluating GM plant pesticides as substitutes for
conventional pesticides).
82. Saigo, supra note 28, at 794-95.
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affecting an entire genetically identical crop,83 has everything to do with
monoculture and little to do with source of the monocultured crop. Likewise, the
pesticide treadmill may well be replicated by pesticide-producing GM crops, but
that is all-there is no special treadmill effect. 84 Resistance to the Bt pesticide in
GM maize is the same problem as resistance to Bt that is sprayed on maize (used
by organic farmers), because the same chemical is involved. A joint study by
several national academies of sciences emphasizes, in addition, that "[m]odern
agriculture is intrinsically destructive of the environment" and so "the
environmental risks of new GM technologies need to be considered in the light of
5
the risks of continuing to use conventional technologies.'A
Surprisingly, in view of the European Union's general anti-GMO stance, a
new report by the European Commission takes essentially the same position. It
concludes that its biosafety research to date "has not shown any new risks to
human health or the environment, beyond the usual uncertainties of conventional
plant breeding." Moreover, "if there are unforeseen environmental effects-none
have appeared as yet-these should be rapidly detected by [EU] monitoring
requirements."86 Even though the Commission takes GMO risks seriously (which
many GMO proponents do not), it also regards them as manageable with existing
safeguards, like other agricultural risks.
II. Two

REGULATORY APPROACHES

The Frankenstein and Better Living Through Chemistry narratives have
become the templates for the two dominant regulatory approaches to GM
technology. Regulators in Europe and United States approach GMOs in
dramatically different ways. The fundamental technical difference is well known:
83. Id. at 795-96.

84. With respect to a single pesticide, the widespread use of the GM crop may hasten the resistence effect. This
is the concern of many organic farmers who use the Bt toxin as an external pesticide for their crops; if this pesticide
is used by nonorganic farmers as well-thus increasing the amount of use enormously--ten the process of reistant
varieties of insects may be sped up. On the other hand, the same would be true if nonorganic farms simply decided
to use Bt as an external pesticide, avoiding any GM involvement at all.
85. ROYAL SOC'Y OF LONDON et al., TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE 19 (2000), awilaeae
http://www.nap.edu/html/transgenic. The report was written by a working group comprised of members from the
United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and the Third World Academy of Sciences. See
also Pimentel, supra note 81 (making this point about pesticides).
86. Press Release, European Commission, GMOs: Are There Any Risks? Launch of a European Round Table
on GMO Safety (Oct. 8, 2001), http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/2001/pr08Oen.html; seealsoEUROPEAN
COMM'N, EC-SPONSORED RESEARCH ON SAFETY OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: A REVIEW OF

RESULTS, http://europa.eu.int/comrn/research/quality-of-life/gmo (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
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opponents of GMOs would regulate any item derived through the GM process,
while proponents would regulate only the characteristics of the finishedproduct.
I will show in this section that the product-versus-product difference is one of
several important ways in which European and American regulatory structures
diverge to a degree that severely challenges the ability of international
environmental and trade law to harmonize them.
A. Process-BasedRegulation
The principal concerns raised by the Frankenstein narrative are the unknown
and unintended consequences of the technology, the potential for catastrophic and
irreversible invasions of alien species, and familiar products that hide malign
characteristics. These concerns cannot be expiated by identifying individual
products as safe or unsafe by conventional measures, because the products have
not been created in conventional ways and their dangers are as yet unknown.
The danger is not the apparent characteristics of the product, but genetic
modification as such, and a process-based regulatory regime is designed to
anticipate and prevent these harms.
The European Union's regulation of GMOs is built on this model.8 7
Agricultural GMOs are regulated by two major legal structures: Directive
2001/1888 (which replaced Directive 90/22089) on the marketing and release of
GMOs into the environment, and Regulation 248/9790 concerning novel foods,
which will probably be replaced in the near future. 9 1 The recitals preceding
2001/18 emphasize the Bride-of-Frankenstein fears of reproduction in the
environment and irreversibility. In addition, the EU has imposed a de facto

87. See generally Tromans, supra note 49. For useful overviews of the EU regulatory scheme, see also A.
Bryan Endres, "GMO: " Genetically Modified Organism or GiganticMonetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes
for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union, 22 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453
(2000); Jeffrey K. Francer, supra note 22; Les Levidow et al., GeneticallyModified Cropsin the European Union:
Regulatory Conflicts as PrecautionaryOpportunities, 3 J. RISK RESEARCH 189 (2000); Terence P. Stewart &
David S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The European Union's Laws on AgriculturalBiotechnology and Their Llect
on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC L. 243 (1999).
88. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1.
89. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15.

90. Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 043) 1.
91. See Commission Proposal for Regulation on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, COM (2001) 425 final
[hereinafter Labeling Proposal].
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moratorium on new approvals of GM products until the Commission finalizes
new rules for labeling and traceability.92
The requirements of the EU regulatory scheme-notification, proof of safety,
labeling, and so on-apply to all GMOs regardless of their individual
characteristics (though Directive 2001/18 provides a "differentiated" (i.e.,
streamlined) procedure for well-known GMOs 93 ). Under the existing novel foods
regulation, a GM food that is substantially equivalent to its conventional
counterpart is exempt from pre-market approval, but not from labeling.94 The
proposed new version goes further and abandons even the special approval
procedure for substantially equivalent products.9 5 It is the process, and not the
final product, that matters.
Both pieces of legislation centralize and politicize 96 regulation of GMOs.
Under Directive 2001/18, initial notification of the proposed release or marketing
of a GMO is made to the member state where it will occur, and the member
state's eventual consent to release or marketing is, as usual in a common market
system, binding on the other member states. Here, however, devolution ends.
The initial notification, including a rather vast amount of information supporting
the application, is communicated, through the Commission, to all of the other
member states. They may comment or object, and the handling of objections is
not symmetrical. If there are no objections (and that has never happened 97), the
notification state may approve or not, as its own judgment dictates. However,
under the new GMO directive, if there are objections that are not resolved or
agreed to by the notification state, then the matter must be resolved by the
Commission, advised by a special committee of all members voting by qualified
majority, with disagreements resolved at the Council and Parliament level. 98 (The
old directive also elevated such disputes to the Council for resolution; consent
could only be granted if the Council agreed to it.) The proposal for novel foods
goes even further in centralizing and politicizing these decisions by vesting an

92. Patrice Laget & Mark Cantley, EuropeanResponse to Biotechnology: Research Regulation and Dialogue,

17 IssuEs INSci. & TEcH. 37, Summer 2001, at 37, 40.
93. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, art. 7, Annex V, 2001 O.J. (L 106) I.

94. Council Regulation 258/97, art. 8, 1997 O.J. (L 043) 1.
95. Labeling Proposal, supra note 91, recital (6).

96. I do not use "politicize" pejoratively. To the extent that the process broadens the debate beyond narrow
quantitative measures, it is a good thing.
97. Endres, supra note 87, at 468.
98. Council Directive 2001/18, arts. 13, 18, 30(2), referencing Council Decision 1999/468/EC arts. 5, 7.
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initial opinion in the new European Food Authority. The final decision is taken by
the Commission, but it can be appealed to the Council by any member state. 9
The EU legislation does not directly address the question of burden of proof
in these proceedings, but it quite plainly lies with the proponent of the GMO.
Structurally, the legislation establishes a baseline of no releases, no marketing, and
no use as or in food; prior consent is required.' 00 Before release, marketing, or
food use, the applicant must submit a comprehensive battery of scientific
information, set out in detail in the legislation, demonstrating human and
environmental safety. Similar provisions for pesticide regulation in the United
States are read by U.S. courts to place the burden of proof on the registrant of
the pesticide, 01 and there seems no reason that the same logic should not apply
here.
Finally, the EU directives and regulations offer member states a great deal of
flexibility in responding to GMOs by permitting objections by any member stateas noted above, at least one state has objected to every application to date-by
setting no limitations on the conditions of consent, and by permitting the later
withdrawal of consent. 0 2 A flexible response to GMOs is a hallmark of the antiGMO position,' 3 and it responds directly to the fear of the unknown in the
Frankenstein narrative. This flexibility has been curtailed somewhat by a recent
decision of the European Court of Justice, which insisted that only new
information can serve as the basis for withdrawing consent. 104 Similarly, one can
read the Commission's narrow interpretation of the precautionary principleinsisting, among other things, on detailed scientific and economic investigation in
advance of invoking the principle, on a "proportionate response," and on further
research when it is invoked-as an effort to rein in this flexibility.'
Nevertheless, six member states have stated that they will suspend new
authorizations for GMOs pending adoption of new legislation on tracing, labeling,
and environmental liability.' 0 6 On the whole, then, the European system is
dominated by the concerns of the Frankenstein narrative.
99. Labeling Proposal, supra note 91, arts. 7, 8, 36.
100. Council Directive 2001/18, art. 19 is absolutely explicit about this.

101. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (use of heptachlor/chlordane).
102. Council Directive 200 1/18, art. 23 ("safeguard clause").
103. Aarti Gupta, Advance Informed Agreement: A Shared Basis for Governing Trade in Genetically Modified
Organisms?, 9 IND. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 260.
104. Case C-6/99, Greenpeace v. Map, 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 2746, at *30, 31.
105. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
106. Tromans, supra note 49.
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B. Product-basedRegulation
In the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative, the potential harms of
GMOs are simply a continuation of existing risks, and therefore they ae
knowable and manageable. The regulatory treatment of GMOs by the United
States and the World Trade Organization reflects this approach.
1. The United States
In the United States, regulation of GMOs has followed the Coordinated
Framework for Biotechnology that was developed in 1986 by the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy to organize the activities of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA).' 07 Each agency already had
laws on the books that could in theory reach the uses of biotechnology-as
crops, foods, medicines, pesticides, and as potentially toxic substances-and the
Coordinated Framework chose to use them. This fundamental choice implies that
GMOs are not so new as to require new legislation' 0 8 and that regulation of
GMOs should proceed as it does with familiar substances, on a product-byproduct basis.' 0 9 These two explicit assumptions fit hand-in-glove with the
foundational idea of the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative, that GM
technology is simply a continuation of existing breeding and selection technology.
This approach is reflected particularly strongly in the regulation of GMOs by
FDA. Its statement of policy on new foods adopts a general presumption that
GM foods are not different from their non-GM counterparts, 0 and it takes
essentially at face value the producer's determination whether the food is the
107. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986). Numerous

overviews of the U.S. regulatory regime for GMOs appear in the law review literature, including: Stanley H.
Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology: The Casefor Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.
241, 244-59 (2001); Adler, More Sorry, supra note 23, at 181-83; Francer, supra note 22, at 265-67; Goldman,
supra note 66, at 734-54; Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein,Doctor Nature, and the EnvironmentalLaw of
Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 823-46 (2001); Teel, supra note 28, at 662-67 (covers, in addition,

the new Plant Protection Act).
108. This assumption was recognized and criticized at the time that the Coordinated Framework was being
considered and drafted. See Ruth E. Harlow, Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with
Scientific Uncertainty,95 YALE L.J. 553 (1986) (arguing for required pre-approval and better information); Thomas
0. McGarity & Karl 0. Bayer, FederalRegulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REV. 461,

537-39 (1983) (arguing for a single statute to provide a unified regulatory structure for GMOs).
109. See Francer, supra note 22, at 267.
110. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (May 29,
1992).

2001]

THE PROMETHEUS PRINCIPLE

same or not." l If it is the same, a GM version of a familiar product is regarded
as "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) and not subject to FDA approval." 2
The strategies of deploying existing legislation and of proceeding product-byproduct contribute to another major assumption embedded in the Coordinated
Framework: that GMOs pose no social complications that are sufficiently serious
to include in the regulatory evaluation." 3 Under FDA's Statement of Policy[t]he regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by
which it is developed, is dependent upon objective
characteristics of the food and the intended use of the food (or
its components). . . .[T]he key factors in reviewing safety
concerns should be the characteristics of the food product,
rather than the fact that the new methods are used.14
FDA is here asserting both that fie effects of GMOs are determinable from
examination of the product alone, and also, implicitly, that the effects to be
determined are technical ones. The new Plant Protection Act"15 is even more
aggressive in rejecting social consequences as a relevant factor. It repeatedly
invokes the phrase "sound science" as a kind of mantra to ward off anything
smacking of the precautionary principle.
Levidow and Carr note that the Coordinated Framework thus contributes, in
their apt phrase, to "normalizing novelty," that is, to downplaying the newness of
GM technologies and highlighting their continuity with conventional methods. 6
Sheila Jasanoff observes that this approach "rearranges a potentially limitless

11.See Kunich, supra note 107, at 842-44; Francer, supra note 22, at 269.
112. See Francer, supra note 22, at 269-75; Teel, supra note 28, at 665.
113. This is not just a passive assumption. It locates the debate in an arena in which industrial and commercial
interests have the greatest advantage over their opponents. Reporter Joe Thornton quotes a presentation from a
public relations firm for the industry group Chlorine Chemistry Council, which emphasized the importance of
promoting a "science-based" approach to chemical safety. JOE THORNTON, PANDORA'S POISON: CHLORINE,
HEALTH, AND A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 345 (2000). The technocratic approach remains stronginthe
United States, but it has lost considerable ground in Europe. See Levidow et al., supra note 87, at 195-98,203.
114. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, supra note 110, at 22,984-85 (emphasis
added).
115. The Plant Protection Act was enacted as Title IV of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 358 (2000) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7702, 7711-7718, 7731-7736, 7751-58). It
replaced for these purposes the Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj, and the Plant Quarantine Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 166-167, as well as the late, lamented Halogeton Gomeratus Control Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 16511656, and the Golden Nematode Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150-150g.
116. Les Levidow & Susan Car, Normalizing Novelty: Regulating Biotechnological Risk at the US. EPA, II
RISK 9, 10 (2000).
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expanse of scientific unknowns into familiar paradigms of asessment and
control" to avoid political or social criticism of GMOs." 7 This approach is also
the natural consequence of the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative.
The Coordinated Framework also reflects the U.S. government's
commitment to an assumption that GMOs are safe or pose at most manageable
risks. FDA has the legal authority to require premarket testing to assure that
whole foods are not "adulterated" and that food additives do not pose untoward
dangers.l1 8 It does not, however, exercise this authority with foods and additives
that are GRAS. USDA takes a similar position. The Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates GMOs as potential plant pests. APHIS may
undertake pre-release review, but increasingly it simply requires notification. In
either case, authorization is granted as a matter of course, as APHIS has neither
the resources nor the degree of concern with GMOs to enable it to undertake
serious reviews. " 9 The Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000 expressly adopts
the goal of facilitatingnew biological controls for plant pests, and it provides a
simple, quick way to introduce GM crops after mere notification to USDA. Both
USDA and FDA, in sum, rely primarily on notification and informal consultation
20
to regulate GMOs. 1
Some commentators have argued that the producers of GM products must in
fact submit to extensive regulatory scrutiny under the U.S. system. 12 1 Bt
potatoes, for example, were subject to numerous regulatory hurdles and approval
conditions imposed by the interacting regulatory regimes of FDA, USDA, and
EPA.' 22 On the other hand, the absence of any significant number of
disapprovals (or any at all, as far as I can tell) of GM products suggests a system
that is strongly conditioned to accept the safety of GMOs and, in relatively rare
cases, 123 the manageability of any risks that they may pose.

117. Jasanoft supra note 29, at 313; see also Jasanoff, supra note 4, at 279.
118. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 348 (1994).
119. See Kunich, supra note 107, at 837-41; Teel, supra note 28, at 662-63.
120. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 107, at 249 (USDA), 252-53 (FDA). The Clinton Administration
proposed a mandatory notification of the FDA. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg.
4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001). However, the Bush Administration has extended the comment period for the regulation.
Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods; Extension of Comment Period, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,517 (Apr. 2,
2001). The Bush Administration officially lists its intentions as"to be determined." Long-Term Actions, 66
Fed. Reg. 25,427, 25,435 (May 14, 2001).
121. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 107, at 247-56; Goldman, supra note 66, at 734-54.
122. See Abramson & Carrato, supra note 107, at 256-59.
123. See id at 249 (giving statistics on notifications and approvals at the USDA).
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EPA has been considerably more aggressive in regulating GMOs than either
FDA or USDA, but it, too, has done nothing to slow the development and
deployment of GM technology in the United States. The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) requires EPA to license pesticides before
extensive testing and marketing, and the agency has interpreted the statute to
permit it to regulate the pesticidal components of GM plants, such as Bt cotton
and Bt maize. 124 EPA requires permits for the field testing of such products, but,
as with the other agencies, it has been liberal in granting experimental use permits
and has exempted whole categories of plants that appear to present a low risk of
adverse effects. 125 EPA examines the pesticidal properties of GM plants for the
same dangerous qualities it looks for in other pesticides, which is consistent with
the continuity element of Better Living Through Chemistry. When it chooses to
regulate, EPA balances risks and benefits. Its actions with regard to Bt cotton
and Bt maize fit within the paradigm of manageable risks. It extended the
registrations of both, but expanded the required measures (mainly size and
26
proximity of refuges) to address pesticide resistance.'
While FIFRA has some real potential through its licensing provisions to
restrict GMOs where appropriate,' 27 its reach is strictly limited to one type of
GMO. As has been recognized for quite some time, the broadest potential source
of EPA's regulatory authority in this area is the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA). 128 TSCA was enacted in 1976 with high hopes that it would serve both
as a gap-filler and as a template for addressing newly emerging issues.' 29 Its
achievements have been modest at best, but it has shown some of the hoped-for
flexibility. EPA has taken the fairly aggressive position that GM microorganisms
are new "chemical substances," bringing them into the statute's ambit, and it has
sought notification aid information concerning the deployment and release of
microorganisms that were modified across genuses. 30 Nevertheless, there are
serious limitations to EPA's approach:

124. See generally id. at 253-56; Kunich, supra note 107, at 831-37.
125. Teel, supra note 28, at 663-64.
126. Time Extensions for Bt Corn and Bt Cotton Plant-Pesticides Expiring Registrations; Registtion Prces
and Public Participation Opportunity, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 9, 2000).
127. See Adler, More Sorry, supra note 23, at 183.
128. See Harlow, supra note 108, 563-64; McGarity & Bayer, supra note 108, 537-39.
129. See generallyJohn S. Applegate, The Perilsof UnreasonableRisk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and
Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 261 (1991).
130. Reporting Requirements and Review Processes for Microorganisms, 40 C.F.R. pt. 725 (2000).
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[U]nder newly proposed rules for regulating genetically
engineered microorganisms, [EPA] may only gather information
about the microorganism's genetic structure-that is, what the
microorganism is, not what it does. This may happen for
several reasons. First, the genetic engineer who created the
microorganism rarely has any direct knowledge about the
microorganism's environmental risks, even though that engineer
probably knows what strain was engineered, and may have a
detailed understanding of the microorganism's genetic structure.
Second, while the new rules list factors that the EPA believes
will indicate risk, the new rules fail to identify what parameters
determine risk. Third, the new rules cannot require generation
of new data which might illuminate risk because these rules will
be promulgated under [TSCA], which requires the EPA first to
make a finding that the microorganism "may present" an
unreasonable risk before testing can be ordered. Thus, the EPA
may only be able to gather whatever information is availablemicroorganism source and genetic structure-which only
indirectly and imperfectly illuminates the microorganism's
environmental risks. 131
TSCA's pre-market notification procedure (PMN) is limited to information
existing at a point when information is least available; it gives EPA very little time
to react; and any EPA action must be justified under a stringent "substantial
evidence" standard.1 32 The courts of appeals have been generally unkind to
TSCA, even when it was simply requiring testing of a chemical, 133 and the legal
hurdles set up by Corrosion ProofFittings134 have brought serious regulatory
action under TSCA to a virtual halt. It seems unlikely that, given the uncertainty
surrounding the effects of GMOs, EPA will be in a position to justify any
restrictions on GMOs under TSCA.
131. Robin A. Chadwick, Note, Regulating Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 24 HOFsTRA L. REV. 223, 223-25 (1995).
132. See Applegate, supra note 129, at 303-04; Harlow, supra note 108, at 563-70; Kunich, supra note 107, at
824-31.
133. See Applegate, supra note 129, at 315-30.
134. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Flue-Cured Tobacco
Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (remanding a finding by EPA that
environmental tobacco smoke is a carcinogen).
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The baseline of presumed safety or manageable risks in all of these statutes
makes perfect sense in terms of the Better Living Through Chemistry narrative.
GM technology is not entirely new and unknown, and so its risks are not entirely
new or unknown, either. Accordingly, GMOs are regulated by what Peter Huber
has called an "old-risk" standard-setting regime, in which the burden is on the
35
government to demonstrate the existence and degree of well known hazards. 1
Restrictions on GMOs based on the "the fear of unknown [hazards]" are likely to
36
fail judicial review under such a regulatory structure. 1
2. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) takes a similar regulatory approach,
though less from a considered view on GMOs in particular than from an
institutional commitment to unhindered trade and development. Three WTOadministered agreements potentially apply to GMOs. First, article XI of the
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits "quantitative
restrictions"-a category into which environmental, health, and safety regulation
falls-on imports, but provides a series of qualified exceptions in article XX. 137
Second, the subsidiary Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) explicates and tightens the article XX exceptions. 13 Third, the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 139 applies mainly to labeling and
can be seen as a subset of the SPS agreement.
As an initial matter, the GATT has generally been interpreted to apply to
products and not to the processes by which they were made. In forbidding the
United States to prohibit the import of shrimp that had been caught using methods
that harm the endangered sea turtle, the WTO dispute resolution panel forbade

135. See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1049-50 (1983).
136. Id. Huber explained the Supreme Court's rejection of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) regulation of benzene (see Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607

(1981)) in these terms: "OSHA did not base the decision to change the benzene exposure standard... on the goal
of mitigating a known hazard, but rather on the fear of an unknown one," i.e, cancer.
137. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATTI], as modified by Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154
(1994).
138. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex I A, 69 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/i 5sps.pdf (compliance with SPS is presumptively compliance with XX).
139. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter TBT Agreement], WTO Agreement,
supra note 137.
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If the shrimp themselves met

140
appropriate health and safety restrictions, that was to be the end of the matter.

From the outset, then, the GATT establishes a product-based regulatory scheme.
More generally, the WTO agreements and dispute resolution decisions
thereunder display a distinct bias against regulation-it has struck down any
number of environment restrictions, including all of the restrictions challenged
under the SPS Agreement-and this can be expected to extend to restrictions on
GMOs.' 4 1 Substantively, proponents of regulation have had to justify the
restrictions in terms of several "disciplines.' 4 2 Two are of particular relevance
here. First, all three pieces of WTO legislation require that quantitative
restrictions be "necessary"' 143 and adopt the least trade-restrictive measure that
will accomplish the same goal. 144 Panel decisions have read "necessary"
narrowly. 145 The procedural approach of the WTO allocates to the challenger of
a regulation the initial burden of going forward with evidence of a violation, but
the ultimate burden lies with the regulator. 146 Moreover, WTO panels give little or
no deference to regulatory judgment, which intensifies the impact of the burden
47
of proof.'

140. WTO Panel Report on L.hited States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter Shrimp and Shrimp Products].
141. See Steve Chamovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL
ENVTL. L.J. 271, 273 (2000). This is more broadly true within the GATT framework. See Lakshman Gurusw.rny,
The Promise of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and
Environment Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 196-206 (1998).
142. See Chamovitz, supra note 141, at 278-89 (listing eight disciplines: science requirement, risk assessment,
national regulatory consistency, least trade restrictive to achieve chosen level of protection, nondiscrimination
against other countries, use of international standards where available, recognition of equivalence of regulatory
measures by exporting government, and approval and inspection procedures); Robert Howse, Demoacy, Science
and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L REV. 2329, 2341-57
(2000) (listing role of science, discrimination provisions, and necessity and least trade restrictive provisions).
143. GATT, supra note 137, art. XX(b); SPS Agreement, supra note 138, art. 2(1).
144. TBT Agreement, supra note 139, art. 2.2; SPS Agreement, supra note 138, arts. 5(3), 5(4), 5(6).
145. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna [Tuna
1], Aug. 16, 1991,
6.3, GATT Doc. DS2I/R, GATT B.1.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprintedin 30
I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (not adopted).
146. WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/8 (Mar. 30,
1999) [hereinafter Japan QuarantineCase]; Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 140.
147. With perhaps the exception of what is an acceptable level of risk (SPS), but these must meet a test of
consistency within the state. See Chamovitz, supra note 141, at 280 (citing WTO Appellate Body Report,
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, AB-1998-5, WT/DS 18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter
Salmon
Case],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/
distabase wto members Ie.htm).
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The second important discipline is that trade restrictions must be based on
"science.' 48 This is quite typic al of the trade regime which, as David Fidler has
pointed out, consistently adopts a "science paradigm" for resolving disputes and
making decisions.1 49 "Science," in this context, really means existing knowledge,
as opposed to extrapolation or speculation d out unknown harms. A WTO
dispute resolution panel found, for example, that Australia had violated the SPS
Agreement because it justified its decision with documented uncertainty, rather
50
than with "science.'
The SPS Agreement recognizes, as it must, that many modem hazards are
accompanied by a considerable degree of uncertainty, and that much
environmental, health, and safety regulation, even (or especially) in nations with
highly developed regulatory apparatuses, is based on uncertain knowledge. It
acknowledges this, however, not with general acceptance of such regulation, but
15
rather with an exception to the general science requirement: 5
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on the basis of available pertinent information.... In
such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk
and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly
15 2
within a reasonable period of time.
Article 5.7 is clearly related to the precautionary principle, 153 but it contains a host
of its own restrictions, the most important of which are that the measure must be
provisional and that the member must seek additional information to make a final,
"objective" judgment within a reasonable period of time. 154 Again, it is likely that
the main motivation for this provision is the WTO's interest in encouraging trade.
148. SPS Agreement arts. 2(2), 3(3), 5(l).
149. David P. Fidler, Challenges to Humanity's Health: The Contributions of InternationalEnvironmental
Law to National and Global Public Health, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,048, 10,070 (Jan. 2001).
150. Chamovitz, supra note 141, at 280.
151. The SPS Agreement requires that protective measures be based on science, art. 2(2), and risk assessment,
art. 5(l), except where undertaken under art. 5(7). SPS Agreement, supra note 138, arts. 2(2), 5(1), 5(7).
152. Id. at art. 5(7).
153. As the Hormones case put it with elegant ambiguity, the precautionary principle "finds reflection" in art 5.7
WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998). See also Charnovitz, supra note 141, at 289-90.
154. See Japan Quarantine Case, supra note 146, 89 (listing requirements for maintaining a measure under art.
5.7).
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The insistence on "sound science" is designed to bring predicatability to
regulation, which is very important to traders. 55 However, it also, as we have
seen, attempts to restrict the legitimate discourse on regulation to narrowly
technical issues, unencumbered by consideration of broad social
56
consequences.

The difference between the European and the American and WTO regulation
of GMOs goes beyond the mechanical one of process versus product. The two
regulatory systems see GMOs in entirely different ways, reflecting not merely a
technical divergence, but rather a fundamental epistemological "difference in [the]
knowability and assessability of risks."' 57 Is genetic modification simply an
extension of prior technologies, posing similar risks, manageable with similar
regulatory systems under similar standards applied to familiar characteristics? Or
is it something entirely new, requiring new structures, new knowledge, and
exceptional caution? Can the use of GMOs be resolved technically by applying
existing scientific knowledge to existing technical criteria? Or do they present a
level of novelty that demands new regulatory structures and the consideration of
broad social concerns? Is GM technology an activity in whose basic safety we
are confident, and should encourage unless we have strong indications to the
contrary? Or is it a new, unpredictable power with unknowable consequences? A
regulatory regime has no choice but to confront and resolve these questions of
evaluative criteria, acceptable evidence, and burden of proof. We now turn to the
question whether the precautionary principle offers a way to reconcile these
differences.

155. See Gupta, supra note 103, at 264-65; see also Levidow et al., supra note 87, at 194 (recognizing

predictability as a characteristic of the traditional technocratic approval process).
156. Robert Howse has argued, to the contrary, that the WTO has in fact taken a very broad view of what
constitutes science that includes "divergent" scientific opinion. See Howse, supra note 142, at 2341-44 (quoting
the Beef Hormones Case). Howse also defends the science requirement as a means of forcing true democratic
deliberation over risk issues, instead of restrictions based on whim or incorrect facts. Id.at 2330, 2333-36.
157. Aarti Gupta, Governing Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms: The Cartagena Protocol on
Biodiversity, ENVIRONMENT, May 2000, at 23, 32, 33 n.27; see also Krier & Gillette, supra note 62, at 409-13
(demonstrating that the technological optimists and pessimists do not respond to each others' arguments).
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III.

BRIDGING THE

GAP:

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Faced with the divergent Frankenstein and Better Living Through Chemistry
narratives and the resulting divergence of national regulatory and international
trade regimes, international environmental regulation has been forced to try to
bridge the gap between them. International environmental law offers three
possibilities: prior informed consent (PIC), sustainable development, and the
precautionary principle. Each has a substantial international legal pedigree, and
each has been proposed or adopted as a way of bridging the broader gap between
development and environmental protection. The article now considers the
potential of each to afford a framework for harmonizing the regulation of GMOs.
A. PriorInformed Consent

I begin with prior informed consent, because it is the mechanism that
international environmental law has in fact adopted to reconcile the different
views on GMOs. PIC is the centerpiece of the Biosafety Protocol to the
Convention on Biodiversity, 158 which was negotiated at Cartagena (for which it is
named) and concluded in Montreal on January 29, 2000.159 PIC has previously
been used in a number of international agreements, notably the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal 160 and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International

158. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD]. The CBD was adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992. The
United States has signed but not ratified the CBD.
For a list of signatory parties see
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2001). There was some controversy over the
appropriateness of the CBD as the vehicle for regulating GMOs, since biodiversity is only one part of the issues
that GMOs raise, but the CBD itself quite clearly anticipates further action on GMOs. In article 8(g) the parties
agree to
[establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the
use and release of living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely
to have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health.
Id. art. 8(g), at 825.
159. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027
(2000) [hereinafter Protocol].
160. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; see also Karen M. Graziano, Note, Bkaay
Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of the Environment, 7 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL.L&POL'Y 179,
208 (1995) (discussing the connection between the Protocol and Basel PlC procedures).
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Trade. 16' As its name suggests, PIC requires an exporting state to inform fully
the importing state of the nature and hazards of a shipment in advance, and it
permits the importing state to refuse its consent. Signed by 103 countries, the
62
Cartagena Protocol was supported by both sides of the GMO debate. 1
The Cartagena Protocol focuses on agricultural GMOs and regulates trade in
such products. 163 It applies to "living modified organisms" (LMOs)--a
euphemism for GMOs, insisted upon by the image-conscious United Stateswhich are broadly defined as biological entities capable of transferring genetic
64
material and produced by modem biotechnological techniques.1
Pharmaceuticals and processed foods are specifically excluded. 65 Covered
LMOs are divided into four groups. Those intended for deliberate release into the
environment (e.g., seeds) are subject to the full advance informed agreement
(AIA)-i.e., PIC; AIA is another euphemism insisted upon by the U.S. to avoid
association with hazardous waste-procedure. 166 Those intended for food, feed,
or processing (LMO-FFP) are subject to information sharing requirements and
notification of approvals and refusals through a central Biosafety Clearinghouse.
(Developing countries can also apply AIA to these. 167) Contained uses and transit
are not subject to AIA. The labeling provision is a compromise: an importer can
68
require the packaging of LMO-FFPs to state that it "may contain" LMOs.
Liability and compensation issues are untouched.
The teeth of the Cartagena Protocol are in the importing country's ability to
refuse consent to importation.
Unlike the Basel and Rotterdam PIC
procedures, 169 the Cartagena Protocol describes in detail the permissible bases for
refusing consent. Pro-GMO states were very concerned that without such detail
161. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 11, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1 (1999), available at http:/www.hem.unep.ch/pic

[hereinafter Rotterdam Convention].
162. Because, the United States has not ratified the underlying CBD, it is not eligible to sign or ratify the
Protocol. Nevertheless, as the world's largest producer of GMOs, the United States took a leading role in the
negotiations. See Gupta, supra note 157, at 26.

163. For a complete picture of the negotiations leading up to the Protocol, as well as the Protocol's provisions,
see id at 25-27; see also Saigo, supra note 28, at 801-11; Schweizer, supra note 37, at 586-98.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Protocol, supra note 159, arts. 3(g), (h), (i), at 1028-29.
Id. arts. 3(g)-(i), 5, at 1028-29.
Id arts. 7-10, at 1030-31.
Id art. 11(6), at 1032.

168. Id. art. 18(2)(a), at 1035.
169. The Basel Convention speaks of the "right to prohibit import" of hazardous wastes. Basel Connti art
4(l)(a), at 661; see also id. art. 6(2), at 664 (requiring no qualifications on right to refuse consent). The Rotterdam
Convention requires only that a refusal be consistent with domestic treatment of the chemical. Rotterdam
Convention art. 10(9), at 7.
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PIC would become either a disguised form of trade protectionism17 or, more
importantly, an opportunity to raise "unscientific" objections to GMOs. PIC
standing alone could be a powerful tool for GMO opponents, as it would allow
such states to refuse entry of GMO products on the basis of inchoate concerns
or simply fear of the unknown. By limiting the grounds on which consent may
be refused, the Protocol steps directly into the center of the debate about the
standards for evaluating GMOs, the acceptable evidence, and the burden of proof.
The Cartagena Protocol "takes as its starting point a risk assessment rather
than the much feared nonscientific criteria for decision making.'' If the
assessment shows an unacceptable level of risk, then the state may refuse entry.
If the risk assessment is inconclusive, the importer may nevertheless withhold
consent, based on the protocol's own version of the precautionary principle:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the
Party of import, taking also into account risk to human health,
shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question.., in order to avoid or minimize such
7
potential adverse effects. 1
As will be discussed below, the precautionary principle has been expressed in a
variety of formulations, reflecting a range of positions on a number of aspects of
the principle.' 73 The Cartagena version clearly envisions a technical decision,
though the socio-economic impacts of harm to biodiversity, and particularly to
74
local and indigenous communities, may be considered.1
In this respect, the Cartagena Protocol comes closer to the SPS Agreement
than to the Rio version of the precautionary principle. 175 However, the Cartagena
170. See Saigo, supra note 28, at 811.
171. Gupta, supra note 157, at 30; see also Protocol, supra note 159, arts. 15(1), (2), annex III, at 1033-34,
1045-46 (setting out detailed requirements for such risk assessments).
172. Protocol, supra note 159, art. 10(6), at 103 1; see also id.
art. 11(8), at 1032 (describing a parallel provision
for LMO-FFPs).
173. See generally John S. Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the
Precautionary Principle 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413 (2000).
174. Protocol, supra note 159, art. 26(l), at 1039.
175. See Chamovitz, supra note 141, at298-30 1.
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Protocol is deliberately vague about its relationship with the WTO legislation. The
application of the WTO is a matter of considerable moment, because, as we have
seen, the WTO approach distinctly disfavors trade restrictions on GMOs. The
SPS Agreement, for example, treats any precautionary regulation as strictly
temporary, to be followed promptly by studies to confirm or obviate the
restrictions, a provision that is not found in Cartagena. The Protocol certainly
contains no release from the WTO requirements, a specific savings clause was
eliminated, 76 and the remaining indications consist of conflicting statements in
the preamble. 177 At a minimum, the requirement to give reasons for a decision to
deny consent 178 will probably set the stage for trade challenges in a hostile WTO
forum.' 79 Whether or not Cartagena or SPS controls, it is plain that PIC per se
does not offer its own substantive regulatory standard for GMOs. The PIC
procedure simply enables the application of the precautionary principle by
80
individual states, subject to challenge in the WTO or other forum.1
B. SustainableDevelopment
The idea of "sustainable development," in the words of its inventors, "is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.'' It aims to protect natural
resources, habitat, human health, and intergenerational equity within the
constraints of nature and environmentally appropriate innovation. 82 Since its
original articulation in the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment
and Development, sustainable development has become the principal way that
international environmental law has sought to reconcile the often-conflicting needs
176. Gupta, supra note 157, at 30-3 1.
177. The relevant provisions read:
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supporting with a
view to achieving sustainable development,
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights
and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements,
Understandingthat the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other
international agreements[.]
Protocol, supra note 159, pmbl., at 1027. To summarize: "maybe, yes, and no."
178. Id. art. 10(4), at 1031.
179. See Paul E. Hagen & John Barlow Weiner, The CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety: New Rules for
InternationalTrade in Living Modified Organisms, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 697, 713-14 (2000).
180. The Protocol does not establish a dispute resolution mechanism. See Gupta, supra note 157, at 32.
181. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987) [hereinafter WCED].
182. See John C. Dembach, SustainableDevelopment as a Frameworkfor National Governance, 49 CASEW.
RES. L.REV. 1, 24-31 (1998).
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of environmental protection and economic development, especially within
developing nations. The idea was formally endorsed by the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The Rio
Declaration, together with Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan for actions to
implement it, is in effect a statement of the principles of sustainable
development.183
Sustainable development would seem to be a logical framework within which
many of the effects of GMOs on agricultural economies could be considered. It
embraces developmental issues like increased dependence on multinationals, selfdetermination of economic systems, choosing against consumption values,
respect for indigenous agriculture, and so on, all of which a purely technical
approach sets aside.' 84 Sustainable development ought to be a place to examine
the larger question of what kind of development we want.
In practice, however, sustainable development turns out to be a poor
candidate for bridging the gap between the two views of GMOs. As Guruswamy
and others have lamented, the pendulum has been swinging toward the
development side of environment and development.' 85 What we have called a
"syncopated sustainable development"' 86 offers little comfort that the concerns of
sustainability will in fact play a role in the regulation of GMOs. If what the
proponents of GMOs say about the potential of these technologies and the
manageability of their risks is true, or even half true, one can make a very good
case that GMOs are in fact needed for sustainable development to be realizedespecially if one is emphasizing the development side. Like the original Green
Revolution, they could improve crop yields and nutritional value. Even better,
GMOs could reduce the dangerous and expensive reliance on pesticides and
fertilizers, and slow the growth of agriculture on marginal land.' 8 7 To the extent
that sustainable development encourages technological innovation rather than a

183. Seeid at 21.
184. See Jasanoff, supra note 4, at 278-80 (discussing the importance of social and economic consequences to
evaluation of GMOs).
185. See Lakshman Guruswamy, International Environmental Law: Boundaries, Landmarks, and Realities,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 43, 76-77.
186. See John S. Applegate & Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction: Syncopated Sustainable Development, 9 D.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001).
187. See NAT' L ACAD. PRESS, TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE 6 (2000); Buechle, szprait
68, at 316-23; GOKLANY, supra note 53, at 4-13; see also Adler, Biosafe supra note 38, at 772-74 (arguing that
GMOs will in fact improve biodiversity).
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return to earlier forms of agriculture, the view endorsed by the originators of the
term, 88 GMOs are an entirely appropriate-indeed, welcome-response.
The optimistic view of the role of GMOs in sustainable development is not, of
course, the view of the opponents of genetic modification. Even accepting the
claimed benefits of GMOs (which, by and large, they do not), the opponents see
many potentially unsustainable side effects. This, of course, brings us right back
to the central problem of uncertainty. Sustainable development, which balances
environment and development, present and future, is a strategy that relies heavily
on detailed information about environmental hazards and complex natural
systems.189 But the problem with GMOs is the lack of fundamental information.
Consequently, sustainable development as such is not particularly helpful in
resolving this debate.
That said, the Rio Declaration enumerates several principles of sustainability,
and one of them (Principle 15) is the precautionary principle. Avoiding severe,
irreversible losses is a logical, even necessary, aspect of sustainability for future
generations. 190 In addition, the precautionary principle "is especially important for
sustainable development because the carrying capacity of the global environment
as well as regional ecosystems is mostly unknown."'1 91 This describes the GMO
dilemma exactly. Given uncertainty whether GMOs are the ally or enemy of
sustainable development, a sustainable approach would make its judgment on
GMOs by going slowly, within the framework of the precautionary principle or
something like it. Thus, as with PIC, sustainable development returns us to the
precautionary principle as the operative provision for bridging the GMO gap. It is
now time to turn to the precautionary principle itself.
C. The PrecautionaryPrinciple
1. A Brief Introduction to the PrecautionaryPrinciple
The precautionary principle has its origins in a German environmental
concept, Vorsorgeprinzip or "foresightedness principle," which can be freely
188. The World Commission acknowledged that sustainability imposes limits on development, but held out the
prospect that "technology ... can be both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth.
WCED, supra note 181, at 8.

189. See Dembach, supra note 182, at 73-76.
190. See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forwardand Ore
Back or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 634 (1995).
191. Dernbach, supra note 182, at 62; see also Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the Precautionary
Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 854 (1996).
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translated as the obligation to "foresee and forestall" environmental harms.' 92
Foresight in this context implies looking over the horizon for unexpected
dangers, 193 an idea with obvious resonance for the Frankenstein narrative and
technological pessimism generally. Taking "precautionary measures" was central
to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, 194 the
parties to which established a framework for reducing emissions of ozonedepleting substances before the ozone "hole" had been actually observed. 195

Many regional and global instruments have explicitly adopted the precautionary
principle since then.' 96 While there is no single statement of the precautionary
principle, and the various formulations differ in several respects,' 97 it has been
adopted by industrialized countries in the charter of the European Union' 9 8 andthe
fundamental Canadian environmental law, 199 by developing countries in the
Bamako Convention on Hazardous Waste in Africa, 20 0 and globally in the
Convention on Biological Diversity 20 ' the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, and of course the Rio Declaration.20 2 Most recently, the
precautionary principle was adopted by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
192. Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner, Introduction: To Foresee and to Forestall, in PROTECnING PU
HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1,4 (Carolyn Raffensperger &
Joel Tickner eds., 1999); see also Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in GermanyEnabling Government, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31, 38-39 (Tim O'Riordan & James
Cameron eds., 1994) (arguing that the German term includes both foresight and action to prevent).
193. Joyce Tait & Les Levidow, Proactive and Reactive Approaches to Risk Regulation, FUTURES, Apr. 1992,
at 219, 221-22.
194. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, pmbl., 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1529
(1987) (stating in its preamble "[m]indful also of the precautionary measures for the protection ofthe ozone layer
which have already been taken at the national and international levels").
195. David Hurlbut, Beyond the Montreal Protocol: Impact on Nonparty States and Lessons for Future
Environmental Protection Regimes, 4 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 344, 348 (1993).
196. For catalogues of treaties, see Peter H. Sand, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: A European Perspective, 6
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 445-46 (2000); David VanderZwaag, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in
Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAQ 355, 363-74
(1999); James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International
EnvironmentalLaw, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 432-38 (1995). An exhaustive catalogue can be found in HARALD
HOHMAN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALLAW
(1994), which documents uses in both international and national law.
197. For useful comparisons of selected versions, see Katz, supra note 75, at 957; Gupta, supranote 157, at 30.
VanderZwaag describes a spectrum from "passionate" to "cool" embrace. VanderZwaag, supra note 196, at 358.
198. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997), art. 174(2), 37 I.L.M. 56, 117 (1998)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
199. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, ch. 33, pmbl., 1999 S.C. 1999 (Can.).
200. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 4(3)(0, 30 1.L.M. 773, 781 (1991).
201; see also Protocol, supra note 159, pmbl., at 1027; CBD, supra note 158, pmbl., at 822.
202. UNCED, Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3.3, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992).
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Organic Pollutants, which was signed by the US, EU, and a host of industrialized
and developing states.2 °3 It is a key feature of the Cartagena Protocol, as we
have seen.
While the precautionary principle has become something of a fixture in
international environmental treaties, 20 4 the main response in American academia
has been dismissive. Unfortunately, much of this criticism is based on a
caricature which depicts a draconian, unreasoning, inflexible command that
rejects all technologies that have emerged since the Industrial Revolution. For
GMOs, it is said to demand absolute proof that no harm could possibly occur, or
else the total abandonment of GM technology.20 5 Some zealous advocates of the
precautionary principle have taken positions something like this, 20 6 but the reality
of the text, scholarship, 20 7 and real-world implementation is a flexible, pragmatic,
and cautious approach to the uncertainty that characterizes new technologies like
genetic modification. In short, it is the foresight principle, not the Luddite
Principle. It seeks to anticipate the risks of new and existing technologies so as
to avoid or minimize them. As implemented, it is neither rigid, nor the enemy of
serious scientific inquiry.
203. UNEP, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, arts. 1, 8(9), Annex C part
V(B), 40 I.L.M. 532, 534, 541, 559 (2001) [Stockholm POPs Treaty].
204. The near universal acceptance of the precautionary principle in a variety of treaties has led to a lively debate
over whether the precautionary principle should be recognized as rule of customary international law, which would
make it binding upon all states. Those who favor such recognition point to the numerous treaties and national
laws. See James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: A FundamentalPrincipleof Law and
Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1991), HO AK
supra note 196, at 12 passim. Those opposed point to the recentness of the treaties, the lack of an agreed upon
formulation of the principle, and the lack of evidence of actual state behavior consistent with the precautionary
principle. See Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,790, 10,799 (2001); Catherine Tinker, State Responsibility and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 53 (David
Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); Daniel M. Bodansky, Scientific Uncertaintyand the PrecautionaryPrinciple
33 ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991, at 4. This is not the place to enter that debate. Both the European Union and the
United States have agreed to the Rio Declaration, the SPS Agreement, and the Protocol (indirectly, in the case of
the United States), so its general applicability to GMOs seems clear.
205. See Adler, Biosafe supra note 38, at 777; see also Adler, More Sorry, supra note 23, at 205; INDUR M.
GOKLANY, APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS, POLICY STUDYNO.
157, 24 (Ctr. for the Study of Am. Bus., Washington University, St. Louis 2000); Abramson & Carrato, supra
note 107, at 244-45; Cross, supra note 191, at 853; Stone, supra note 204, at 10,796.
206. Jonathan Adler gleefully quotes some of the more intemperate claims. See Adler, More Sorry, supraroe
23, at 173-74, 178.
207. For generally supportive works, see THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 204. See generally INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE, supra note 192; HOHMAN, supra note 196; Hickey & Walker, supra note 196. For a variety of
perspectives, see generally Symposium, Perspectiveson the PrecautionaryPrinciple,6 J. HUM. & ECOLOGICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 383 (2000).
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2. The Elements of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
The precautionary principle can be broken down into four distinct elements
that cut across all of its versions: trigger, timing, response, and iteration.2 °8
Together, they provide a framework for identifying, evaluating, learning more
about, and avoiding or minimizing the risks of technology-and for providing the
time ("breathing space," as Levidow and Carr put it 20 9) for doing so.
a. Trigger

The trigger incorporates two prerequisites: an anticipated serious or
irreversible harm, and a minimum amount of scientific information on the basis of
which harm is foreseen. As to harm, some commentators insist on irreversibility,
as it most clearly justifies taking regulatory action in advance of proof.2 10 Others
keep the focus on uncertainty by limiting the operation of the precautionary
principle to situations in which the consequences of an action are so great as to
be beyond

our capacity to predict with accuracy. 21

The European

Commission's Communication on the Precautionary Principle requires uncertainty
to be demonstrated, but sets the seriousness trigger at any level above the
member state's desired level of protection for its citizens.2 t2
The precautionary principle is frequently criticized in the United States for
allowing any imagined harm-Frankensteinis, after all, just a novel--to trigger
regulatory action. The Rio statement of the principle only hints otherwise
("absence of full scientific knowledge"), but other statements are clearer that

208. See Applegate, supra note 173, at 415-20 (describing elements and strategies).
209. Levidow et al., supra note 87, at 191.
210. See generallyPhilippe Sands, The "Greening" of internationalLaw: Emerging Principlesand Rules, I
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293-323 (1994); Robin Attfield. The PrecautionaryPrincipleand Moral Valjes in
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 152-64. Christopher Stone, who is otherwise
quite skeptical of the precautionary principle, recognizes the need to treat irreversible harms with particular care.
See Stone, supra note 204, at 10,797.
211. See Charmian Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in
Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 509, 510-12 (1998); see also BerradA
Weintraub, Science, InternationalEnvironmental Regulation and the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards
and Defining Terms, I N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 191-92 (1992).
212. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Feb. 2,
2000, at 17. The Member State's ability to set this level is not unlimited; it must be, among other things,
nondiscriminatory and consistent with other domestic risk levels. Id. at 19. The Commission's views on this and
other aspects of the precautionary principle are echoed in a discussion paper issued by the Canadian government.
See GOV'T. OF CAN., A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH/PRINCIPLE: PROPOSED
GUIDING PRINCIPLES (Sept. 2001).
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scientific investigation must precede invocation of the principle.21 3 The European
Commission repeatedly emphasizes the need to perform a traditional risk
assessment based on available information,2 14 and the EU Treaty's adoption of the
precautionary principle is qualified by the parallel requirement to rely on "available
scientific and technical data."21 5 Likewise, as we have seen, the Cartagena
Protocol "takes as its starting point a risk assessment."2 6 While these are
particularly strong statements of the informational prerequisite, most
commentators are in agreement that anticipated harms must have some scientific
basis.217 Jasanoff, for example, argues that the "systematicity" associated with
risk assessment brings a healthy discipline to the precautionary principle that helps
8
to avoid capture by "fads and fancies.'2I
b. Timing
The core purpose of the precautionary principle is the management of
uncertainty, 2 19 and so timing-the relationship between taking regulatory action
and the degree of scientific knowledge concerning the risks of concern-is its
distinctive feature.
The precautionary principle goes beyond preventive
regulation, which addresses known risks with a goal of avoiding familiar

213. For example, United Nations, Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, pmbl.,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer], states unequivocally that the parties are "determined to protect the ozone layer ly taking
precautionary measures" and also that "measures taken to protect the ozone layer from depletion should be based on
relevant scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic considerations."
214. "Before the precautionary principle i; invoked, the scientific data relevant to the risks must first be
evaluated." Comm'n of the Eur. Cnitys., supra note 212, at 13-14; see also id. at 3 (stating that the Precautionary
Principle is mainly relevant to risk management, which follows risk assessment).
215. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 198, art. 174(2), (3), at 117; see Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M.
Verschuuren, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in International,European and Dutch Wildlife Law, 9 COLO. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 43, 47 (1998).
216. Gupta, supra note 157, at 30.
217. See, e.g., Andr6 Nollkaemper, "What You Risk Reveals What You Value," and Other Dilemmas
Encountered in the Legal Assaults on Risks, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONALIAW: THE
CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 204, at 73, 83-84; see also John S. Gray, InegratPrecaur"y
Scientific Methods into Decision-making,in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 204, at 133, 135.
Some authors assert, however, that
"precautionary science"-that is, science that is not based on traditional, mechanistic proof of cause and effect and
whose results are not necessarily quantitative-is an appropriate basis for action. See Katherine Barrett & Carolyn
Raffensperger, PrecautionaryScience, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPtEMENIING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 106, 109-12, 117-18.
218. Jasanoff, supra note 4, at 281.
219. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 197-98.
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harms. 2 20 The timing element permits regulatory action before the causal
relationship between the activity and the potential harm has been fully proven; that
is, it holds the activity of concern in abeyance in the period between the
scientifically credible identification of risks and their characterization sufficient to
make a comprehensive regulatory determination. 22 1 The term that best describes
2 22
this timing is anticipatory,
the "forestall" part of the "foresee and forestall"
interpretation of the Vorsorgeprinzip.
The existence of uncertainty is also, in some views, a prerequisite to the
application of the precautionary principle. If examination of the existing science
reveals a well characterized risk, the precautionary principle is no longer
"relevant," in the words of the European Commission, and a final, reasoned
regulatory decision should be reached on traditional grounds.2 2 3 This is not total
uncertainty, of course, in the sense of pure speculation or the fevered
imaginations of Greenpeace activists.
Consistent with the informational
prerequisite in the trigger, uncertainty means the lack of a definitive cause-andeffect relationship or a quantifiable dose-response relationship. 224
The
"Wingspread" formulation of the precautionary principle focuses on this point:
"When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically." 225 This is hardly a radical
position. Indeed, it has been criticized as merely restating the obvious point that
true certainty never exists.226 In fact, however, the precautionary principle would
shift the practice, established in the United States in the Benzene decision, of
demanding a high degree of proof of the existence and magnitude of a risk in
advance of regulatory action.2 27

220. See Tait & Levidow, supra note 193, at 219 (distinguishing between proactive and reactive regulation).
221. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 204, at 3, 12-13; Ken Geiser, Cleaner
Production and the Precautionary Principle, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT:

IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 323, 323-24, 326.
222. Applegate, supra note 173, at 417.
223. See Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., supra note 212, at 13.
224. See Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in ContemporaryEnvironmental
Policy and Politics,

in PROTECTION PUBLIC

HEALTH AND THE

ENVIRONMENT:

IMPLEMENTING THE

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 15, 17.
225. Wingspread Conference Statement (Jan. 25, 1998), reprintedin PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 353, 353-54.
226. See Stone, supra note 204, at 10,790 (characterizing full certainty as a "red herring").
227. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6(3) Human &
Ecological Risk Assessment 459 (2000); Applegate, supra note 129, at 282-84.
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For many observers, it follows from the timing element that the burden of
proving the safety of an activity or technology lies entirely with its proponent.228
The European Commission, however, firmly rejects this position, retaining instead
the preexisting burdens of proof, for instance, on proponents of drugs but not on
industrial chemicals. 229 The relevant treaty language is silent on this point, though
the Rio formulation tends to support the EU position. It states that the
precautionary principle operates as a "reason" for not "postponing" regulatory
action, suggesting that the precautionary principle relates only to timing and that it
otherwise functions within an existing framework of burdens of proof. It cannot
be said, therefore, that reversal of the burden of proof is necessarily part of the
precautionary principle as actually adopted.
c. Response
The most misrepresented aspect of the precautionary principle is the nature
of the regulatory response it mandates. As noted above, its critics are fond of
charging or assuming that there is but one response: to ban or forgo an activity
or technology altogether. 230 This is transparently untrue. None of the texts of
the principle says this. Some speak of avoiding or minimizing the anticipated
harms, 231 and of course precautionary timing may result in delays in adopting
technology, 232 but both are a far cry from entirely abjuring a new, potentially
beneficial technology. Moreover, while "minimizing" harm may not satisfy the
228. See Margo Brett Baender, Pesticides and Precaution: The Bamako Convention as a Model for an
InternationalConvention on Pesticides Regulation, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 557, 588 (1991); see gunerally
Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetic Information, the PrecautionaryPrinciple, and Burdens of Proof in PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supranote 192, at
74, 86-96; Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner, Introduction: To Foresee and Forestall, in PROIrIW3PJWC
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 1,3-4;
Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 224, at 24-25; see David Ozonoff, The PrecautionaryPrincipleas a Screening
Device, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 100, 101-104; see also Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 201-03 (explaining
that the burden shifts after the opponent presents a prima facie case for a risk); see HOHMAN, supra note 196, at
334-35 (explaining that burden shifting represents the "strong version" of the precautionary principle). No serious
advocate of the Precautionary Principle, however, suggests that the proponent of the activity must conclusively
demonstrate a zero risk of harm.
229. See Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., supra note 212, at 21.
230. See sources cited supra note 205.
231. E.g., Protocol, supra note 159.
232. Delays, of course, can cause harm to those who would be aided by the new product or technology. Frank
Cross has analogized new drugs, delays in which can cost lives. See Cross, supra note 191, at 884-86. This is a
persuasive argument only in retrospect, as it assumes that the new drug is a penicillin and not a thalidomide. The
whole point of the precautionary principle is that ex ante we do not know which it is. If we did, we would not need
the precautionary principle.
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preference of some critics for an economically optimal level of harm, it is not the
same as an expectation of zero risk.233 The commentary makes it clear that an

absolutist view of the precautionary principle is untenable, and instead that it
embraces a range of regulatory responses.234 Bans may be appropriate in some
cases, but in others it may mean (in the case of GMOs) process controls,
isolation of field tests, limited periods of approval, pre-release testing,
investigation of alternatives, or further research. The precautionary principle, in
other words, can be a roadblock or simply a speedbump. 2 5
Treaties have been more explicit about the qualities of the response than its
nature. We have seen that the Rio Declaration speaks of "cost-effective"
measures. 236 Commentators have even suggested that it requires the "least
hazardous alternative, ' 237 or that alternative courses of action be available. 238 The
qualifier that appears to be in greatest favor among both commentators and
governments is "proportionate. ' 239 Proportionality-both in the sense of benefits
and costs (broadly understood) and of the desired level of protection-is the
primary quality that the European Commission expects in implementation of the
precautionary principle. 240 The use of the term "as appropriate" in the relevant
section of the Cartagena Protocol also suggests proportionality.2 4' Moreover, the
regulatory authority's review of the proportionality of the response is to be
233. Cf Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
"minimize" in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) means less than the acceptable risk level).
234. See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Implementing the PrecautionaryPrinciple. Challenges and
Opportunities, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 204, at 249, 250-53; Levidow et al., supra note 87, at 189; Nollkaemper, supra
note 217, at 77-79.
235. Joel A. Tickner, A Map Toward PrecautionaryDecision Making, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH&THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 162, 163.
236. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
Agenda 21, the action plan appended to the Rio Declaration, speaks of response actions "which aejusgfied
in their own right." Agenda 21, at 35.3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992). Presumably, this is an oblique
reference to the cost-effectiveness standard.
237. Thomas Lundmark, Systemizing Environmental Law on a German Model, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &POL'Y
1, 10 (1998).
238. Freestone & Hey, supra note 234, at 258; Nicholas A. Ashford, A Conceptual Frameworkfor the Use of
the PrecautionaryPrinciple in Law, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMP1EMENTIN THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 192, at 198, 200.
239. Proportionality is said to be central to the original German concept. See Konrad von Moltke, The
RelationshipBetween Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in Implementation of the Precautionary
Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 204, at 97, 102-04.
240. See Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., supra note 212, at 4-5, 18-20.
241. Chamovitz, supra note 141, at 298-301.
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comprehensive, which allows consideration of the whole range of potential
benefits, as well as risks. 24 2 If a new technology shows promise of enormous
benefits, say, an AIDS vaccine, there is nothing in the precautionary principle that
would slow development, beyond existing requirements of safety and efficacy.243
d. Iteration
The precautionary principle, focusing as it does on present uncertainty, fairly
implies that some action will be taken to reduce the uncertainty to levels
appropriate for taking final regulatory action. The Rio formulation leaves open the
question of who is to produce the new information and when it is to be produced.
If the burden of proof is allocated to the proponent of the activity, for example,
one would expect that the principle would create an incentive for the early, private
development of such information. The SPS Agreement appears to contemplate a
different scenario:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on the basis of available pertinent information.... In
such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk
and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly
within a reasonable period of time. 24
Here, the burden of producing the new information clearly lies with the regulator.
The Cartagena Protocol is similarly structured, but it does not use the term
"provisional" and gives no indication of a time limit. The European Commission
in effect splits difference. It requires that precautionary measures be "periodically
242. See Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., supra note 212, at 19-20; see also Nollkaemper, supra note 217, at 77-79,
91-93.

243. This may not satisfy the complaint of critics of the precautionary principle that it fails to consider adequately
countervailing risks (e.g., the risks of forgoing or delaying a useful technology). See, e.g., Stone, supran e204,
at 10,791. It would provide the proponent of a new technology the opportunity to demonstrate that a tremendous

need for the product exists, as would be the case with an AIDS vaccine. Nothing in GMO agriculture comes
remotely close to that level of urgency. See Cross, supra note 191, at 861; see also Julian Kinderlerer, GCatka
Modified Organisms: A European Scientist's View, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 556, 557 (2000) (asserting that

biotechnology has "not yet delivered" on anticipated great benefits for the world's people). The precautionary
principle has never to my knowledge been actually used to thwart the discovery of a major vaccine-or, for that
matter, any technological discovery at all.
244. SPS Agreement, supra note 138, art. 5.7.
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reviewed" in light of available scientific information, and that such measures "may
assign responsibility for producing the scientific evidence necessary for a
45
comprehensive risk evaluation. '
The common feature of all of these variations is that the precautionary
principle anticipates revisiting the judgments that are based on it. Uncertainty may
be unavoidable, but it is not desirable, and efforts to reduce uncertainty are
worthwhile (up to a point).246 Science policymakers are increasingly recognizing
that toxic substances cannot be evaluated or regulated once and for all. Two
recent American studies of risk assessment and management have recommended
an iterative or cycling process of investigation, regulation, and learning,247 that is
the kind of feed-back loop that is standard in science. 248 Jasanoff argues that the
precautionary principle should be a "framework for learning in the face of
uncertainty."2 49 In some cases, for instance, saccharin,2 50 we will learn that the
hazard is less than expected; in others, for example, stratospheric ozone, the
hypothesized harm will be later confirmed.
3. GMOs and the PrecautionaryPrinciple
GMOs are a good candidate for the application of the precautionary principle.
With respect to the trigger, serious hazards have been identified. While most are
still "over the horizon," they are not without a basis in scientific theory or
unsupported by empirical evidence. Moreover, GMOs are not just persistent, a
characteristic of which we are already particularly wary; they propagatein the

245. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., supra note 212, at 20-22.
246. After a certain point, efforts to generate more information have significant costs of their own and can be
The Role of Risk Assessment in
counterproductive. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself:
Environmental Decision-making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1648-50 (1995).
247. PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM' N ON RISK ASSESSMENT & RISK MGMT., FINAL REPORT: 2 RISK
ASSESSMENT AND

RISK MANAGEMENT IN

REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING

http://www.riskworld.com/Nreports/1997/risk-rpt/volume2/pdf/v2epa.pdf;

7, 32 (1997),

available at

COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION,

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 163-64

(Paul

C.

Stem

&

Harvey

V.

Fineberg

eds.,

1996),

available

at

http://books.nap.edu/books/030905396X/html/163.html.
248. Gray, supra note 217, at 144-46.
249. Jasanofl supra note 4, at 277.

250. Saccharin was banned in the United States on the basis ofanimal carcinogenicity. Two decades of further
study determined that it is only an animal carcinogen, not a human one. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS, NAT. TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NINTH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, app. B, at 5-7 (2001), available at

http://ehis.niehs.nih.gov/roc/toc9.html.
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environment, raising the serious potential for irreversibility on the model of exotic
species.2 5'
As to timing, uncertainty surely exists in the imprecision of the technologies,
in the size of the genetic leaps that GM technology can make relative to
conventional breeding, and in the complexity of the genetic and ecological
systems into which these substances are introduced. This situation was forecast,
and precautionary measures ratified, in the landmark Ethyl Corp. case:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult
to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof
of cause and effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if
the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served. Of
course, we are not suggesting that the Administrator has the
power to act on hunches or wild guesses. . . . However, we
do hold that in such cases the Administrator may assess risks.
He must take account of available facts, of course, but his
inquiry does not end there. The Administrator may apply his
expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not
completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from
trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect
data, from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as
"fact," and the like. We believe that a conclusion so drawn
may, if rational, form the basis for health-related regulations
under the "will endanger" language [of the Clean Air Act].252
Ethyl does not anticipate a shift in the burden of proof, but it, like the
precautionary principle, permits regulation in the face of uncertainty. GMOs do
push the envelope of the precautionary principle, because both the causal
relationships and the harm itself are uncertain. This is not, for example, like
endocrine disrupters, where endocrine-based harms have been observed and only

251. See, e.g., Stockholm POPs Treaty, supra note 203.
252. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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the relationship to chemicals is unproven.253 But it is closely analogous to the
original ozone controls, which were adopted in advance of observed effects, on
the basis of a scientific theory of the causal interaction between
chlorofluorocarbons and stratospheric ozone. 254
The precautionary principle envisions a range of regulatory responses, and so
a precautionary regime could respond to GMOs in several ways. While serious
concerns have been raised about the technology, there is little to indicate that all
(or even most, or any) uses will result in an uncontrolled, catastrophic chain
reaction. If we are concerned with the irreversibility of introducing GM species
into the wild, very strict prerelease testing may be quite sufficient to address the
risk.255 In addition, some products or species may pose more serious risks than
others.2 56 The recently released studies of Bt maize showed that the pollen of one
GM variety was far more toxic to nontarget butterflies than others.25 7 Clearly, it
would be entirely reasonable to regulate that variety more strictly or even to
prohibit it. 258 Similarly, GM fish are nearly impossible to contain and may have
particularly undesirable effects on wild populations. 259 They, too, could
reasonably be subject to special controls or entire restriction, even though other,
less mobile species (plants, for example) are not.
Countervailing risks 260 are also relevant to response. Regulation of risk tradeoffs may be implicit in the absence of public outcry over GM insulin, and no
sensible regulatory scheme would reject an effective AIDS vaccine merely
because of its GM origin. Even where the benefits are great, however, the
precautionary principle counsels at least as much skepticism in evaluating claimed
benefits (a characteristic notably absent in the pro-GMO literature) as claimed

253. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY, HORMONAL CHAOS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OR THE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENDOCRINE HYPOTHESIS 124-31 (2000).
254. Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and
Remarkably Particular,19 J. ENVTL. L. 49, 50 (2000/2001) (characterizing the initial ozone regulation as "truly
precautionary").
255. Stone, supra note 204, at 10,796.
256. Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 28, at 2092.
257. See Zangerl et al., supra note 43.
258. One of the co-authors of the study points out that this variety had already been withdrawn from the market,
though apparently not for its toxic effects. David N. Leff, "IconicInsect" Beats Back Biotech Rap, BIOWORLD
TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001 (quoting May Berenbaum).
259. Royal Soc'y of Can., supra note 28, at 150-70 (discussing GM salmon).
260. See generally JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, EDS., RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) (describing a general theory of countervailing risks).
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risks. 26 1 Thus, the precautionary principle offers an alternative to the productversus process-based regulatory regimes. While the principle may be triggered on
a process basis, individual products can be separately evaluated.26 2 The initial
concern is raised by the GM process, but the danger is expressed by individual
products. Those dangers may vary for any number of reasons, and the response
should vary accordingly.
Finally, decisions to permit or restrict GMOs should be subject to revisitation.
The new EU directive on GMO releases, for example, affirms an iterative
approach, specifying that initial rejection is without prejudice to later
acceptance.263 If, as anti-GMO activists like to say, we are engaged in a huge
experiment with genetic modification, then presumably we will learn something
from it. What we see (or do not see) now or in five or ten years will not, of
course, be definitive-but it will be more than we know now, and it should be
part of our ongoing decisions. From this perspective, both proponents' haste to
bring GMOs to market and opponents' destruction of field tests prevent the kind
of learning that is necessary to assure safety.264
The precautionary principle, in sum, can help to bridge the gap between the
Frankenstein and Better Living Through Chemistry legal regimes, because it
recognizes the regulatory validity of unproven (but not unfounded) dangers, and it
sets in motion a process for resolving them, all the while holding the activity in
appropriate abeyance to avoid irreversible harm. The precautionary principle may
be a call to move slowly with GMOs, but it is by no means a call to ban them in
all cases and forever.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROMETHEUS NARRATIVE

I have argued that the divergent regulatory regimes for GMOs are rooted in
two radically different narratives of science and knowledge, and that this
accounts for the absence of common ground between the two points of view. I
have further suggested that the precautionary principle, properly understood and
applied, can reconcile the differences exhibited by the regulatory systems for

261. One recent review notes that "confirming environmental benefit is tricky. Virtually no peer-revied pas
have addressed such advantages, which would be expected to vary from place to place." Brown, supra note 44, at
52.
262. Kinderlerer, supra note 48, at 558-59.
263. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 106) 38.
264. Palumbi, supra note 32, at B9.
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GMOs. The precautionary principle, however, lacks an animating narrative that
underpins and gives ideological coherence to its approach. That is my concluding
task.
"Frankenfoods" is usually a mere soundbite, a throwaway epithet, for
biotechnology. In the first part of this article, I took the analogy literally and
argued that in fact Frankenstein has serious descriptive power for one of the
positions on GMOs. Indeed, it helps to explain the reason that the anti-GMO
position is so widely held despite the absence of demonstrable harms. I now
want to take the examination of Frankenstein a step further, in the hope of fimding
an alternative to its narrative for GMOs. Frankenstein, despite its subtle and even
sympathetic portrayal of the monster, has an unambiguous message-Do Not
Presume to Tinker with Life Itself-which accounts for its enduring power as a
metaphor. However, the usually forgotten subtitle of Frankenstein, is The
Modern Prometheus, and the latter offers a new perspective.
In one version of the Greek creation myth, Prometheus formed human beings
out of clay and had Athena breathe life into them.265 The more familiar
Prometheus story continues from there. Prometheus, feeling sorry fir the
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short lives of the humans, stole fire from
Olympus and brought it to humans, teaching in addition all the technical arts. (In
fact, substitute Prometheus for Chemistry in the DuPont mural, and you get the
picture.) Zeus was displeased that mere mortals had acquired these Olympian
conveniences, but he was mollified by the offerings that people made to him,
because they were now cooked and so wafted a far better aroma up to Olympus.
Prometheus, apparently not satisfied, then conspired with the human beings
to cheat Zeus of the best parts of the sacrificial animals. They made two piles of
meat: one was bones and gristle, but covered with the rich fat that is particularly
pleasing as a burnt offering; the other was the good meat, but stuffed into the
animal's stomach and the whole covered with the offal. Given the choice, Zeus
chose the pile covered with fat. When he discovered his mistake, Zeus was
enraged and had Prometheus chained to a mountain peak, where an eagle daily

265. For the Prometheus myth I have relied on H. J. ROSE, A HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 54-56(19591
EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 85-93 (1942),
HESIOD,
WORKS AND DAYS, available at
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACLiHesiod/works.html, and HESIOD, THE THEOGONY [hereinafter HESIOD,
THEOGONY], available at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Hesiod/theogony.html.
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pecks out his liver only to have it regenerate each night for another day of
torture.

26 6

Prometheus, however, was not the only one punished by Zeus for the
sacrifice trick. Hephaestus made a figure out of clay, Athena breathed life into
her, Aphrodite gave her beauty, and Hermes gave her guile. Her name was
Pandora.26 7 She married Prometheus' brother, Epimetheus, and the rest is (so to
speak) history. She brought with her a beautiful box, could not resist opening it,
and a world of trouble was released to punish humans for tricking Zeus.
Victor Frankenstein was the modem Prometheus, first, because he was the
creator of a new species. This analogy offers us little illumination, however,
because, unlike the malformed and malevolent species that Frankenstein created,
the creation of human beings in the Greek story was at worst morally neutral.
Furthermore, the myth contains no suggestion that Prometheus was punished for
the act of creation. The theft of fire and tricking of Zeus, on the other hand, are
directly relevant. Shelley undoubtedly saw in Prometheus' theft and hideous
punishment a story of hubris and retribution, 268 and she is not alone in this
understanding of the legend.26 9

The theft and punishment part of the Prometheus story is, it seems to me,
considerably more complex and ambiguous than Shelley would have it. It is quite
remarkable in the myth that Zeus did not punish humans as symmetry or irony
would seem to demand, that is, either by removing fire and technology or by
using fire and technology to strike at the humans. Instead, the symmetry is of an
entirely different kind: the beauty of Pandora and the box she bore, like the rich
fat covering bone and gristle, belied what lay within. The fire itself was not the
source of the harm, nor was it Prometheus himself whose gullibility introduced
Pandora to humankind. (As to the latter, Prometheus had a literally ironclad alibi:
he was chained to the mountain at the time.) Trouble and danger, therefore,
266. A more optimistic version is that Prometheus was eventually rescued by Herakles. It is also the more
probable version, since climbers have never to my knowledge actually run across Prometheus in the mountains of
eastern Turkey.
267. At least one author has used the Pandora myth to describe GMOs, though the author's position is
supportive of GMOs. See ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF

GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000); but cf THORNTON, supra note 113 (describing chlorine as "Pandora's

Poison" in the title of his book).
268. She may have changed her mind about him in later years. See WOLF, supra note 12, at xxviii.
269. For example, Donovan Webster's powerful book about the aftermath of war (unexploded ordnance, land

mines, nuclear waste) equates Prometheus and Alfred Nobel. "The chain of technology Nobel initiated has led to
more than 100 million deaths by war since he died, making this-by hundreds of times-the bloodiest century in
the history of the world." DONOVAN WEBSTER, AFTERMATH: THE REMNANTS OF WAR 8-9 (1996).
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come with technology, but they are fundamentally separablefrom the technology.
Prometheus is the bringer-but not the author-of our troubles.2 70
This interpretation stands in distinct contrast to Frankenstein's monster and
the Frankenstein narrative, in which the technology itself is the source of our
woes. In the myth, fire is an unalloyed good, and humans were perfectly capable
of using fire properly. It was not the fire, but the humans' greed, that brought
down Zeus' wrath, and it was the human willingness to be misled by beautiful
appearances that provided the instrument of the punishment. The lesson of
Prometheus' story, then, is retribution for the greedy choice, not retribution for
technology as such. 27'
Ted Taylor, a former nuclear weapons designer who shared in the 1995
Nobel Peace Prize for his anti-nuclear activism, drew precisely this lesson from
the Prometheus myth:
The weapons are a symptom of something deeper. It's not a
biological need, like for food. It's a boundless desire for power.
These days, we understand the destructiveness of nuclear
weapons-and we can save ourselves or destroy ourselves with
that knowledge. The world, as a global population, has become
Prometheus. The choice is ours.272
Likewise GMOs, "No unequivocal conclusions can be drawn about the overall
effect of genetic engineering technologies. It is clear that any manipulation of
organisms, whether by conventional means or by genetic engineering, poses some
danger to human health, to present systems of agricultural production, and to the
natural environments. 2 73 The challenge is not in the technology itself, but in the
care with which we use the technology, and in our ability to resist the lure of
profit without considering consequences.
270. Hesiod's timing has humans already in possession of fire, and removal of fire was punishment for the
sacrifice trickery (which was Prometheus' connivance, but motivated by some other dispute). Then Prometheus
steals fire back, which is followed by Pandora and Prometheus' rock punishment. In either case, it was not fieper
se that brought down Zeus' punishment, but rather a display of human greed; in neither case, is fire the bringer of
both good and of punishment. See HESIOD, THEOGONY, supra note 265.
271. The story of Icarus and Daedalus story has a similar lesson: the tool (wings made of feathers, string, and
wax) can be used wisely, as Daedalus himself did, or hubristically, as Icarus did by flying too high and close to the
sun. Daedalus is still honored as a craftsman, and Icarus suffered for his pride (as opposed to greed). See Geman
Nat'l Merit Found., Legend of Daedalus, http://www.studienstiftung.org/daedalus.html (last visited Dec. 16,
2001).
272. WEBSTER, supra note 269, at 142.
273. Lewontin, supra note 28, at 83.
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Over fifteen years ago, Krier and Gillette critiqued the dominant paradigm of
technological optimism. Prefiguring the claims of genetic modification, they
offered this example of the optimistic view: "Ifthe world is running short of
food, we can count on technological innovation to increase the productivity of
agricultural land . . . through better seeds, better fertilizers, herbicides and

pesticides., 274 But, they warned, "technology is, after all, a mixed blessing." The
seeds and pesticides may be better, but they may have unexpected and
Technological optimists tend to ignore these
undesirable side effects.
consequences, yet there is every reason to think that "the forces behind
technological development are systematically biased in the direction of generating
and neglecting certain kinds of undesirable consequences, pollution chief among
them. 275 Krier and Gillette focused on the ability to externalize pollution costs
that affect a common good, but the same is true of harms that are externalized
because they are insufficiently defined (or even known) to permit internalization
through markets, the tort system, or regulation.2 76 The latter is ignorance, and it
is also the greed of which the Greeks warned. Technology, as the Prometheus
legend tells us, brings both good and bad, and where profits (a desire for the best
meat) drive the deployment of a technology and there is no profit in identifying its
harms, there is no reason to think that the technologists will spend adequate
resources to identify the harms.277
The Prometheus legend, in this sense, undergirds the precautionary principle.
It accepts technology's existence--fire and the technical arts are good thingsbut it also recognizes the tendency of human beings to misuse technology out of
greed. The allergenic potential of soybeans modified with genetic material from
Brazil nuts, which is often cited for the detectability and manageability of GMO
risks, was in fact known before the variety was even developed; the project was
stopped only when regulatory scrutiny was imminent.2 78 The social critique of
GMOs is also relevant here. Most GM investment is in technologies that improve
profits rather than relieve human suffering. The value of the investment, in turn,
is based on the continuing domination, through intellectual property, of the next
generation of agriculture by a small number of already wealthy American and
274. Krier & Gillette, supra note 62, at 407.
275. Id. at 413.
276. Krier & Gillette describe both latency, irreversibility, and zero-infinity (unlikely but catastrophic effects) as
having these characteristics. Id. at 427. Clearly, all apply to GMOs.
277. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorancein the Manufactureof Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L REV.

773, 790-96 (1997).
278. Lewontin, supra note 28, at 82.
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European corporations. 279 Greed makes new technology dangerous and warrants
caution in adopting it.
The precautionary principle also emphasizes the importance of unintended,
unexpected, and unwanted consequences-and hence the critical need for
foresight 28 0-in evaluating beautiful packages. Krier & Gillette continued their
critique: "The gambles implicit in the optimistic outlook are made tempting by a
variety of considerations, some of them of indisputable allure. There are the
optimists themselves, whose credentials and authority take on all the more weight
because they stand behind a story each of us wishes to hear."' 28 1 It is
dangerously inadequate to respond only to those effects that look dangerous, that
is, that have already been demonstrated-by "sound science" or otherwise--tobe
so. Instead, we must look forward to anticipate problems not now evident but
which, with hindsight, we would have wished to have known about. In bringing
Pandora to live among people, Epimetheus did something that, in retrospect, he
must have wished he hadn't done. Appropriately, his name means "afterthought."
The precautionary principle, in contrast, is the foresight principleVorsorgeprinzip-and it is only fitting that its patron and narrative should be
Prometheus, whose name in Greek means "foreseeing."

279. A number of the contributors to this conference have expressed the concern that the huge potential of GM
agriculture will not benefit those most in need of assistance. See Messer, supra note 69; Brush, supra note 71;
Yvonne Cripps, Patenting Resources: Biotechnology and the Concept of Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (2001).

280. As Kenneth D. Pimple nicely puts it: "we fear the vengeance of a higher power-whether God or fate--r
our own invariable inability to take account of all factors and foresee all consequences." Kenneth D. Pimple, 7he
Ethics of Human Cloning and the Fate of Science in a Democratic Society, 32 VALP. U.L. REV. 727, 732-33

(1998).
281. Krier & Gillette, supra note 62, at 428.

